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ABSTRACT
The substantial proliferation of the Internet has made it the most critical infrastructure in
today’s world. However, it is still vulnerable to various kinds of attacks/malwares and poses a
number of great security challenges. Furthermore, we have also witnessed in the past decade
that there is always a fast self-evolution of attacks/malwares (e.g. from worms to botnets)
against every success in network security. Network security thereby remains a hot topic in
both research and industry and requires both continuous and great attention.
In this research, we consider two fundamental areas in network security, malware detec-
tion and background traffic modeling, from a new view point of node behavior profiling under
enterprise network environments. Our main objectives are to extend and enhance the current
research in these two areas. In particular, central to our research is the node behavior pro-
filing approach that groups the behaviors of different nodes by jointly considering time and
spatial correlations. We also present an extensive study on botnets, which are believed to
be the largest threat to the Internet. To better understand the botnet, we propose a botnet
framework and predict a new P2P botnet that is much stronger and stealthier than the current
ones. We then propose anomaly malware detection approaches based directly on the insights
(statistical characteristics) from the node behavior study and apply them on P2P botnet de-
tection. Further, by considering the worst case attack model where the botmaster knows all
the parameter values used in detection, we propose a fast and optimized anomaly detection
approach by formulating the detection problem as an optimization problem. In addition, we
propose a novel traffic modeling structure using behavior profiles for NIDS evaluations. It is
efficient and takes into account the node heterogeneity in traffic modeling. It is also compati-
ble with most current modeling schemes and helpful in generating better realistic background
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traffic. Last but not least, we evaluate the proposed approaches using real user trace from
enterprise networks and achieve encouraging results. Our contributions in this research in-
clude: 1) a new node behavior profiling approach to study the normal node behavior; 2) a
framework for botnets; 3) a new P2P botnet and performance comparisons with other P2P
botnets; 4) two anomaly detection approaches based on node behavior profiles; 4) a fast and
optimized anomaly detection approach under the worst case attack model; 5) a new traffic
modeling structure and 6) simulations and evaluations of the above approaches under real user
data from enterprise networks.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the botnet framework, consider
the worst case attack model and propose corresponding fast and optimized solution in botnet
related research. We are also the first to propose efficient solutions in traffic modeling without
the assumption of node homogeneity.
1CHAPTER 1. Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
The wide deployment and continuous popularity of the Internet also lead to dramatic
increase of attacks and fraudulent activities. Especially, botnet, a state-of-the-art malware,
has become a primary platform for most malicious activities on the Internet [97]. With the
distributed nature and controllable characteristic, it is now considered as the largest threat to
the Internet. To prevent against this emerging threat, better detection techniques to identify
botnets (bots and C&C channel) and better environments (realistic background traffic) to
evaluate those detection techniques (to remove any potential weakness and problems) are both
important fields of study.
Past studies on botnet detection have been focused on centralized ones using specific C&C
protocol (e.g. IRC), without taking into account the potential advances in C&C protocol and
structure. This results in the incapability of most proposed schemes to detect P2P botnets
using multiple protocols in C&C. Similarly, past studies on traffic modeling model the network
traffic by individual application or application mix, without considering the differences between
different nodes. This leads to the problem in traffic generation that, for different network nodes,
the choice of applications/destinations and the traffic characteristics for the same application
are from the same underlying distributions respectively. As a consequence, all network nodes
need to be considered homogeneous in terms of traffic generation, which is not realistic in
general for traffic modeling.
21.2 Thesis Statement
Although there is no obvious correlation between detection and traffic modeling, in this
thesis, we show that it is possible to specify a behavior-based model for both fields. The
behavior-based model is useful for reasoning about the mechanisms of modeling traffic from
heterogeneous network nodes. The behavior-based model is also useful for reasoning about
the difference between normal and abnormal traffic at the behavior level and new detection
algorithms used for P2P botnet detection. In addition, we also show that it is possible to
incorporate botnets of all different kinds under an underlying framework to better understand
the inherent correlation between them.
Furthermore, given that any good detection scheme should still perform well by taking into
account the impact of attackers, we extend our proposed detection algorithms and propose a
new one under the worst case attack model, where attackers know all the detection parameter
values and can adjust the attack strategy to avoid being detected. Similarly, for any new
traffic modeling schemes, it is better to make use of existing mature techniques to accelerate
the development period. We show in this thesis that the newly proposed traffic model is
not only capable of generating better realistic network traffic, but also compatible with most
current major models in the literature.
1.3 Introduction
In the past decade, the substantial proliferation of the Internet in both wired and wireless
fields has made it the universal communication platform and part of the most critical infras-
tructure in today’s world. According to [99], the Internet has distributed to over 233 countries
and world regions and has more than 1.596 billion users by the end of March 2009. The average
growth rate of Internet users is over 340% worldwide from 2000 to 2008. Especially, in some
places such as Mideast, this rate is as high as 1296% [99]. In the meantime, there has been
explosive growth of technologies and services over the Internet. For instance, during the past
decade, we have witnessed the popularity of Internet services ranging from email to WWW
(World Wide Web), from FTP (File Transfer Protocol) to P2P (Peer to Peer), from VOIP
3(Voice over IP) to online video or VOD (Video on Demand), from online chatting to online
gaming. Furthermore, the Internet has become an integral part of our lives and more and
more people rely on it for their daily lives ranging from amusement to study and work. It is
also a key platform to exchange crucial information such as financial information and personal
private data.
All these discussed above lead to the common belief that the future global information
transport network will be a hybrid network that has several different domains (e.g. wide-area
Internet, enterprise and wireless networks) interconnected by IP (Internet Protocol). However,
the network (e.g. Internet) was not originally designed to protect against malwares/attacks
and has many potential vulnerabilities from the security perspective, e.g. buffer overflow.
Therefore, to ensure the Internet its further popularity and prevent against any potential
financial or personal losses, confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) have to be taken
into account to provide reliable and risk free network services. For example, online transactions
must be secure enough to prevent credit card information theft by attackers.
Moreover, as the Internet is increasing dramatically in its capacity, speed and coverage,
there is always a great demand on new security techniques to improve the performances of
the current ones and cope with the latest malwares. Therefore, in this research, we study
and design efficient and effective techniques to provide security guarantee for the Internet.
In particular, two fundamental areas in network security are considered: malware detection
and realistic background traffic generation. We hope that the proposed schemes can serve as
fundamental components for network security research, and the key observations made in this
research can provide further insight to solve the hard problems in network security.
1.4 Motivations & Research Focus
The increasing reliance on the Internet also poses a number of great security challenges
[97]. Network security thereby has become more and more important in providing security
guarantee to ensure the proper functionality of the Internet. However, despite a great number
of network security techniques such as firewalls and intrusion detection systems have been
4proposed and deployed in the Internet, today’s Internet is far from secure and vulnerable to
various malwares/attacks.
In contrast, malwares also evolve quickly and one significant current evolution is bot/botnet.
It is known to be the platform of many current attacks. Moreover, as pointed out in [38],
the sudden disappearance of worm after 2004 is probably not because the Internet is much
more secure, but more likely because attackers no longer focus on infecting a large number of
computers just to attract media attention, instead, their attention has shifted to compromising
and controlling victim computers, an attack scheme which provides more potential for personal
profits. Therefore, our research work in this thesis is motivated by the current Internet situation
and summarized as follows:
• The fast increase of the Internet. With the goal of providing AAA (anywhere, anytime
and anyone) services, the Internet is increasing dramatically in capacity, speed and cov-
erage. Accordingly, it also poses great demands on security techniques to match the scale
of the Internet.
• The increasing reliance on the Internet. As people use the Internet for various purposes
ranging from amusement to study and work, there is also an increasing number of security
problems in every aspect of the Internet. For example, security issues (e.g. clickfraud)
arise when online advertisement and pay-per-click payment method are used.
• Malwares never stop evolving and evolve at a very fast speed. The evolution refers to both
variations of the origin malware and new types of malware. For example, evolution from
common worm to polymorphic or self-stopping worm, from worm to botnet. Therefore,
there is always a requirement to design countermeasures against the latest and future
malwares.
• Attackers are becoming more sophisticated and covert. Since the sudden disappearance of
worms after 2004 is very likely due to the fact that attackers have shifted their attention to
make more profits [38], various ways can be used by attackers to avoid being detected by
5the known and traditional detection techniques. Consequently, better security techniques
are needed to detect more sophisticated attacks.
• The monopoly of operating systems (e.g. Windows) used throughout the Internet hosts.
This feature makes malwares spread more easily and widely once a single vulnerability is
found. That is, once a vulnerability is found in a host in a network, it is very likely that
a majority of hosts in the network have the same vulnerability due to system monopoly,
which is favorable for malwares.
• The current user awareness of network security is not going to change much in the near
future. As pointed out in [96], even many latest security related patches or updates
are available online, many users are unaware of installing them for security purposes.
Further, the normal user may have difficulty to differentiate the modern attacks, e.g.
phising.
Accordingly, to design good security countermeasures, many security aspects have to be
considered jointly, including understanding of the latest malwares and their variations; de-
signing detection schemes at different levels (e.g. host and network levels); speeding up the
detection schemes for fast response; designing mitigation schemes to minimize the damages;
designing traceback schemes to seize the real person behind the attack; evaluating the proposed
schemes to fix any possible weakness and publish corresponding patches or updates to prevent
any future damage. In this research, our main goal is to address the issue of network security
and exclusively concentrate on two important areas: malware detection and background traffic
modeling in an enterprise network environment, with the reasons given below:
• Malware detection is usually the basis for many other security countermeasures. For
example, mitigation and traceback techniques can be applied for further analysis after
the detection of malware. Moreover, if a better detection scheme is implemented, it can
greatly reduce attackers’ attempts in doing nefarious work, as they will have a higher
chance to be caught.
6• A thorough evaluation is needed before implementing any detection scheme or comparing
the performances of different detection schemes. Consequently, modeling/generating
realistic background traffic and attack traffic are both the basis for such evaluations.
However, unlike the attack traffic generation which is relatively easy and straightforward,
generation of realistic background traffic is much more difficult as it requires considering
many different aspects of the normal traffic.
• The enterprise network is not well studied as compared to the wide-area Internet. In
[10], the authors claim that the nature of traffic inside enterprises remains almost wholly
unexplored more than 15 years after studies of wide-area Internet traffic began to flourish.
As the enterprise network is also an important part of the current Internet, we will focus
ourselves mainly on this system.
1.5 Research Objectives and Overview
There are many potential directions/techniques to solve the problems discussed above. In
this research, we consider solving them from the perspective of node behavior profiling. Node
behavior profiling refers to profiling the traffic characteristics captured at different layers from
different nodes. It is a good candidate to above issues. Because a good node profile scheme
can help network administrators and researchers detect abnormal behaviors caused by either
simple malicious attacks or misconfigurations. We also believe and will show in this research
that, when the host-based behavior profiles are coupled with new network-based techniques,
the node behaviors are also promising in detecting advanced malwares, such as botnets. In
addition, nodes of similar behaviors can further be grouped together for traffic modeling.
However, limited research has been done to this end and most of them focus on detecting
misconfigurations or older attacks (e.g. scanning).
Therefore, our objectives in this research can be summarized as follows:
• Understand the normal node behavior from the network perspective using a new node
behavior profiling approach. Provide key information that can be used for further analysis
in detection and modeling.
7• Understand the latest malware and its variations using a new malware framework and
comparisons among themselves.
• Detect the network anomaly based on the understanding of both normal and abnormal
node behaviors from the network perspective.
• Model realistic background traffic for NIDS evaluations based on the understanding of
the traffic from normal behaviors.
To achieve the above goals, we conduct research in three topics as illustrated in Figure
1.1. To be specific, we first propose a correlated node behavior profiling approach which is
able to characterize normal behaviors of different kinds. The main idea of behavior profiling
is to extract the correlated behavior information shared by different nodes. Due to the way
people use the Internet, this behavior correlation happens frequently among different nodes.
We then study in detail not only the properties of each individual behavior, but also the
possibility of using them in worm detection. The study on the behavior profiles also provides
key observations that can be further utilized for detection and modeling.
Moreover, as botnets pose a significant danger to the Internet, we consider P2P botnets as
the malware in this research. To better understand botnets and their future variations. We
study not only the botnet analysis from the literature, but also the source codes of several well-
known bots. We then propose a botnet framework capable of integrating all known botnets
and design a new P2P botnet named lcbot (loosely coupled bot). The proposed botnet is much
stronger and stealthier than the existing botnets from evaluation results.
Furthermore, based on the insights of behavior difference gained from the above work, we
propose a series of anomaly detection approaches based on the proposed behavior profiling
approach and statistical testing to detect the existence of P2P botnets in enterprise network
environments. A fast and optimized anomaly detection approach is also proposed under the
worst case attack model. In addition, by considering behaviors of the same pattern are the real
source of the network traffic, we propose a new traffic modeling structure which is able to model
the traffic from heterogeneous nodes and applications. Finally, we validate the assumptions
8made in this research and evaluate the proposed approaches using real network user traces
under different metrics and achieve encouraging results.
Figure 1.1 General picture of this research
1.6 Contributions
In summary, central to our approaches in this research is the node behavior profiling ap-
proach that groups the behaviors of different nodes by jointly considering time and spatial
correlations. The detection and modeling approaches are based mainly on the behaviors iden-
tified by it. In particular, our contributions in this research include:
1. A new node behavior profiling approach which captures time and node correlations to
study the behavior of normal nodes. We show that it is easy to understand the node
behavior using the profiles and the normal behaviors are generally of different types.
We also show in our evaluations that the behavior profiles are of different popularity
and part of them can be considered statistically stable from the network perspective.
9In addition, we give an example on worm detection to demonstrate that the profiles
are capable of being used for further analysis and detection when coupled with different
statistical testing methods;
2. A framework for botnets, which is able to capture botnet structures of all known kinds
and predict new botnets;
3. Based on the proposed framework, we predict a new botnet that we call the Loosely Cou-
pled P2P Botnet (lcbot). It is stealthy and can be considered as an extension of existing
P2P botnet structures. We also design several new metrics and conduct experiments to
compare the performances between lcbot and other P2P botnets in the literature to gain
insight understanding of P2P botnets;
4. Two behavior based anomaly detection approaches on P2P botnets by coupling the statis-
tical tests with the node behavior profiles identified. In brief, the key difference between
our work and previous work in botnet detection is that, instead of trying to filter out
the botnet behaviors in a network, we detect them by measuring their impacts on one or
more normal behaviors in a statistical way;
5. A fast and optimized anomaly detection approach on P2P botnets. We make use of SPRT
(Sequential Probability Ratio Test) to measure the impacts of the C&C behavior from
P2P botnets (H1) on normal behaviors (H0) in a fast manner. We propose an approach
that simplifies the behavior of each node in a stable way suitable for fast detection via
SPRT. Then, under the worst case attack model, we formulate the C&C detection prob-
lem as an optimization problem and derive the optimal values for H1 mathematically. An
SPRT based fast and optimized detection approach is further evaluated under different
traces;
6. A new traffic modeling structure for NIDS evaluations and several important observations
that are helpful to improve the realistic level of current modeling schemes. By taking
into account that the node behavior is the real source of the network traffic, we take
a step further to propose a novel traffic modeling structure that captures the traffic
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characteristics by jointly considering the node heterogeneity with other known features.
We also apply empirical CDFs to model the common traffic features under this structure.
In our initial evaluations, the empirical CDF and the modeling structure work well under
the real user data from enterprise networks. We also obtain several important new
observations that can be further used to improve the current traffic models.
7. Validation of the assumptions made in this research. Simulations and evaluations of the
above approaches are further conducted under real user data from enterprise networks.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the botnet framework, consider
the worst case attack model and propose corresponding fast and optimized solution in botnet
related research. We are also the first to propose efficient solutions in traffic modeling without
the assumption of node homogeneity.
1.7 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents the proposed research
in node behavior profiling; we introduce the related work in both node behavior and traffic
profiling. We then give a detailed example to use node behavior profiles to analyze the normal
node behavior and discuss the possibility of worm detection using common node behaviors. In
Chapter 3, we present our study on botnet, we review the related studies on botnet from both
literature and our analysis on the bot codes we obtained. We then propose a botnet framework
and predict a new botnet. The new botnet is further evaluated and compared with current
bots in the literature.
A series of anomaly detection techniques are proposed in Chapter 4 which in general can
be used to detect abnormal behaviors in the network, the techniques are based on the insights
from the understanding of normal node behaviors. As an example, we apply our detection
techniques on the Command and Control channel (C&C) detection of a known botnet. Chapter
5 discusses our techniques for realistic traffic modeling for NIDS evaluations. We do a solid
survey on the recent major traffic models in the literature and find out that all of them make
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the assumption on node behavior homogeneity. Although this assumption holds for many other
cases at the aggregate level, it is too strong for NIDS evaluations, especially anomaly NIDS
evaluations. Therefore, we take a step further to relax this assumption, build a traffic modeling
structure which is able to yield better realistic traffic generation and compatible with most
current schemes. We finally summarize our research and discuss our future work in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2. Correlation based Node Behavior Profiling for Enterprise
Network Security
Profiling is a promising tool for many aspects in network security [4] [20] [7] [5] [16] [13]
[8] [21] [7]. In this research, our main goal is to couple node behavior profiles with statistical
tests on enterprise network security. Limited work has been done in the literature. In this
chapter, we first propose a correlation based node behavior profiling approach to study normal
node behaviors in enterprise network environments. We then propose candidate metrics to
measure the change of node behaviors with worm present. In our evaluations, we evaluate
the proposed approach and behavior metrics using real enterprise data (LBNL traces [10]).
The results show that the correlation based node behavior profiling approach can well capture
normal behaviors of different types. Consequently, the node behavior profiles are promising
for anomaly detection when coupled with statistical methods.
2.1 Introduction
Profiling has a wide usage in many areas of computer networks [5], such as traffic/flow
profiling, email profiling, web server profiling, topology profiling and resource profiling. When
used to profile a behavior, it refers to extract information which is representative of behavior
or usage patterns [5]. Little attention has been paid to node behavior profiling [5], especially
for security purposes. In this research, we consider node behavior profiling as capturing the
node (end host) behaviors in terms of node level traffic characteristics which can be further
used for security purposes.
In general, normal behaviors/traffic can be considered different from abnormal ones. There-
fore, when used properly, good node behavior profiles can help network administrators and
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researchers to detect abnormal traffic in the network caused by either malicious attackers or
misconfigurations. They also can help the design of background traffic models for security
product evaluation (e.g. NIDS), as traffic from similar profiles can be considered of same type,
which makes the modeling more accurate. Consequently, to build good node profiles, several
important issues have to be taken into account jointly, including:
1. Diversity in applications and destinations from different nodes, which refers to the pref-
erence/habit of different users;
2. Dynamics of user preference/habit over time;
3. Diversity in traffic pattern of different users (upstream and downstream volume, fre-
quency of visit);
4. Capability of interpreting normal traffic and detecting abnormal traffic at the node level,
which is easy to understand.
In addition, similar to [5], the profile should be in a compact and concise representation,
which means easy to manage and convenient for further analysis; it should also be easy to
update for new behaviors.
In the literature, there are several initial studies that profile the node behavior in terms of
traffic characteristics [20, 5, 8]. The basic idea of most current work is illustrated in Fig. 2.1,
where different patterns represent different node behaviors at the corresponding time interval,
“None” indicates the node is silent in that time interval.
In brief, most current work only profiles the node behavior on individual node within the
time domain, neglecting the correlation between nodes. To achieve a good profile, they assume
that most part of behaviors in continuous time intervals are stable. This could be true if the
time interval is large enough (e.g. 1 day). However, to detect abnormal network traffic, small
time intervals are preferred for more timely analysis and detection response (e.g. it is better to
detect the worm during its early propagation than after its outbreak). When the time interval
is small (e.g. 10 min), the above assumption might be too strong as node behavior will be
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Figure 2.1 Examples of node behavior overlap
quite different at this granularity on two or more consecutive intervals. For example, current
schemes may work well to profile node k in Fig. 2.1, but will lose much information for node
i and j.
On the other hand, given the network applications/destinations are of different popularity,
we observe that the popular applications/destinations are more likely to be used by different
users at different times. Consequently, different users may share similar behaviors at different
times (e.g. behavior at time 2 of node i and behavior at time 1 of j in Fig. 2.1). Therefore, in
this Chapter, we build the node behavior profiles by considering correlations among different
nodes and make the following contributions:
1. Study normal node behaviors using a newly proposed correlation based node behavior
profiling approach. We also show in our evaluations that the behavior profiles are of
different popularity, which is consistent with our observation.
2. Propose new metrics and study the impact of worm propagation on these metrics in
popular behaviors. In particular, we are interested in the case where worms are used to
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form new botnets. In such situations, multiple new worms (either new type of worms
or polymorphic ones) can be used, and usually the propagation is from an initial set
(e.g. a group of existing bots). Consequently, the use of multiple new worms indicates
different ports will be used for propagation, which is hard to detect. Moreover, as there
are enough hosts to be used for propagation, there will be no slow start phase and no
need for fast spreading, which makes most traditional anomaly detection schemes less
effective.
3. Evaluate the proposed schemes via real enterprise data. As mentioned in [10], despite
the extensive study on wide-area Internet traffic, the traffic inside Internet enterprises
remains almost wholly unexplored. Therefore we focus ourselves mainly on the enterprise
network data in the evaluations.
The following of this Chapter is organized as follows: Chapter 2.2 describes the related work
in the literature on node profiling for network security. We introduce the correlation based
profiling scheme and candidate metrics for malware detection in Chapter 2.3. Our detailed
evaluations are shown in Chapter 2.4. In Chapter 2.5, we discuss future directions of this work
and make the conclusion.
2.2 Related Work
Profiling has been widely used in many areas of computer networks [7, 13, 16, 17, 19, 25]. We
mainly focus ourselves on node related profiling in this section. Prior to node level profiling,
many studies have been focused on the flow level profiling. In [17] [18] [104], the authors
characterize the Internet traffic for traffic classification by profiling the traffic at flow level. Flow
level features are considered during profiling, including flow duration, port number, inter-arrival
time, bandwidth, payload size. Flows are further clustered into different groups such that traffic
type from an unknown port can be identified if the flow characteristics match to a known traffic
type group. However, as the Internet traffic varies broadly across different networks, these
approaches either encounter performance challenges or produce unstable outputs for different
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traces [8]. In addition, statistical metrics such as mean and variance used in above research
papers require sufficient samples of a flow before traffic type identification, which is not suitable
for short-term malware traffic.
Therefore, one solution to the above issues is to use node (level) behavior profiling. In the
literature, node behavior profiling can be generally categorized as interest-based [23], entropy-
based [4, 21], and attribute-based [5, 8, 20, 105, 106]. These classes are determined from their
selection of features and the relevant values used for profiling. The interest based approach
[23] aims at preventing the worm from fast propagation through building the host profile and
a set of if-then like rules. The host profiles consist of different combinations of four tuples
(protocol, srcIP, dstIP, dstport) from historical data. Discovering that historical data is not
a good predictor for the usage of ephemeral ports, the authors in [23] set no constraint for
node pairs if they have communicated via ephemeral ports in the profile. To find ephemeral
ports, they associate two tuples (number of connections, number of servers) with all destination
ports, and then use k-means clustering. In the evaluations, they show that their scheme can
prevent the simulated worm propagation very well. However, it is not certain in their paper if
the scheme can detect the worm propagation.
For entropy based approaches [4, 21], the main idea is to use entropy to summarize the
feature distributions to lower the dimension of features. In detail, srcIP, srcport, destIP and
destport are considered as four features for each given host. Each time interval the entropy
of each feature is updated. By use of clustering the known attacks, the authors in [21] are
able to find different synthetically injected attacks such as DOS and worm scan. In [4], by
studying the entropy change of other three features with one fixed, the authors are able to
extract important behaviors for that given feature. And in their evaluations, they show that
it is possible to differentiate the normal behaviors from the abnormal behaviors.
For attribute based approaches, the authors in [20] propose BLINC to study node behavior
profiles. It is a graphlet consisting of five tuples (srcIP, protocol, dstIP, srcport, dstport),
and capable of modeling transport layer flow patterns of specific applications for each host.
Given the pre-known flow patterns for different applications, BLINC is further used for traffic
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classification at aggregate level. As shown in [20], it can classify approximately 80%-90% of
the total number of flows in each trace with 95% accuracy. However, as pointed out by [5], this
work is only suitable in a supervised manner, given the flow pattern of different applications
already known.
An extended version of graphlet is further proposed in [5] by the same authors. By in-
troducing an additional tuple (dstIP) to the original five tuples for the graphlet, and a set of
rules (e.g. delay-accept, aging) in constructing activity and profile graphlets, they achieve a
good balance of concise node behavior representation and meaningful characterization in their
initial study on real user data. Similarly, in [8], the authors consider another five tuples (dai-
lydestnum, dailybytenum, tcpport, udpport, communication similarity) to capture the node
behavior. Rather than using graph representations, the profiles are in XML-like format and
agglomerative clustering is used to group the nodes of similar values in those five tuples. Eval-
uations on real user data showed their scheme has the potential to detect worm outbreak. In
addition, the authors in [105, 106] build a relatively simple host behavior profile which only
uses the number of destinations contacted and a list of destination port numbers.
The authors in [102] propose an architecture for network security by sharing and reporting
past behavioral patterns about network hosts. However, the behavioral patterns are only
attack behaviors observed from network entities; no normal behavior pattern is considered. In
addition, as pointed out in [8], such design brings in trust problem, and it can not detect the
anomalies instantaneously with online traffic.
To summarize, although the above work did a good job in detecting the abnormal traffic,
most of them are at the stage of using examples to illustrate the possibility of their schemes.
Moreover, few of them evaluate their schemes thoroughly by considering the false positive
rates. In the literature, the work in [8] is the most similar one to ours. However, our work
mainly differs from theirs in the following ways:
1. The main difference is that we profile the node behavior in a way which can be coupled
with further statistical analysis, and we consider a more complicated case where multiple
new worms are used which could be further applied for botnet construction, all these
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were not studied in [8];
2. As an important metrics, we evaluate the proposed detection metric by false positive
rate, while the false positive rate is hard to measure hence not considered in [8];
3. We profile all the nodes in the network, while in [8], only about 17% of nodes have their
profiles (they can only profile most active normal nodes, which may not be enough for
malware detection at early stage);
4. We use a shorter time interval and jointly consider the time and node correlation to build
profile, while they built the profile on individual node in an accumulative level at longer
time intervals (1 day).
In addition, it is uncertain that behavior profiles in [8] can be interpreted in a reasonable
way, but we have shown in this Chapter that it is easy to interpret network traffic at the node
level by our approach.
2.3 Correlation based Node Behavior Profiling
In this section, we first discuss the common node behavior cycle from which we choose the
attributes. We then formulate and simplify the behavior profiling problem. Clustering is used
to solve the simplified problem. We also propose a simple heuristic to find the proper threshold
in clustering. Node behavior based metrics that can be used for worm detection are further
discussed.
2.3.1 Common Node Behavior Cycle
The node behavior cycle is defined as a sequence of basic actions of a node in the network.
Unlike previous approaches which search for attributes of node behavior at different levels
(packet, flow and node level), we begin by choosing the common node behavior cycle for
normal nodes, and then identify important attributes in the behavior cycle.
The basic action sequences during the active time interval are as follows:
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1. A normal user first decides which application/service he wants to use (e.g. in order to
do some searching, HTTP is used).
2. Among those destinations providing the wanted service, he then determines which desti-
nation(s) he is interested in, this usually refers to the contents provided by the destina-
tion (e.g. to do a search, the user could use either Yahoo or Google, and he may choose
Google).
3. Traffic is further generated when he visits the chosen destination.
One point to emphasize is that, most of time, the sequence of actions is very important
and differs greatly between the normal user and the malicious attacker. For example, during
worm propagation, any worm host may first generate traffic to find the available victims on
certain ports, and then compromise them. It acts this way to account for the fact that traffic
has to be generated to find victims. On the other hand, it is unlikely that a normal user (or a
majority of normal users) uses the network this way (generate traffic to find available hosts).
This difference provides inherent guidelines in selecting and simplifying the attributes for node
profiling.
2.3.2 Attribute Selection and Problem Formulation
For each node behavior cycle, the first attributes of interest are the possible services to
which the node initiates connections. Within each service, the attributes of interest are possible
destinations a node can choose and corresponding traffic information for each specific service
at that destination. Here we are especially interested in traffic information like the number of
packets sent and the number of bytes sent or received. We do not consider the inter-arrival
time for each service because it is very sensitive to network conditions, such as congestion level,
routing policy, buffer management, and the location of monitoring. Therefore, it may not be
a good indicator of host behaviors.
Using the identified attributes, the node/host behavior profiling problem can be formulated
as: Consider a network consisting of N end hosts, running up to M applications, to D desti-
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Table 2.1 Parameters considered for attributes for host i at interval t
parameters value
pkti,j,t number of packets generated for node i on applica-
tion j at interval t, 0 ≤ j ≤ M , M : total number of
applications
bsi,j,t, bri,j,t number of bytes sent and received for node i on appli-
cation j at interval t
pktdi,j,t number of packets generated for node i on destina-
tion d at interval t, 1 ≤ d ≤ D, D: total number of
destinations
behavior xi,t pkti,j,t, bsi,j,t, bri,j,t, pktdi,j,t , 0 ≤ i ≤ N , N : total
number of nodes
nations. For any host i at time interval t (t is the time interval used to extract host behavior,
for a trace, assume T such intervals in total), then the behavior for host i at time t is denoted
as xi,t = {(pkti,j,t, bsi,j,t, bri,j,t, pktdi,j,t)|1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ M, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ di,j,t ≤ D}
(the above parameters are described in Table 2.1), our objective is to find if there is any
group of similar behaviors shared by different nodes at different times using clustering. Given
the total time interval is T , we could have up to N ∗ T such xi,t’s, which is denoted as
X = {xi,t|1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ t ≤ T}. We want to find clusters A1, A2, ..., Ak, such that:
1. k << N ∗ T
2. for Ai, i = 1, 2, ..., k,∪
i
Ai = X and Ai ∩Aj = ∅, i, j = 1, 2, ..., k, i 6= j
3. for any x in Ai, it is similar or has low distance to all other members in Ai, but is
dissimilar or has large distance to members not in Ai.
This is a multidimensional dataset, and some dimensions are quite large, e.g. D may be
quite large. Therefore, we consider a simplified version of this problem and only examine
behaviors using TCP, as most of worms will use TCP in propagation. To simplify the problem,
we need to select attributes more favorable for normal behaviors while unfavorable for abnormal
behaviors.
Firstly, normal users, although capable of choosing arbitrary destinations, usually associate
themselves on a small range of destinations of different popularity (in-degree, a host in-degree
21
is the number of hosts connecting to it). However, for worm, the selection of destinations
is random regardless of destination popularity. Therefore, we believe replacing destinations
with in-degree will have negligible impact on normal behaviors. Further, we categorize the
destinations as least, less, moderate and most popular categories (named as Q1, Q2, Q3,
Q4 respectively), and only consider the corresponding packets generated in each category
(represented as pktd,i,t). This is achieved by sorting the in-degree of destinations, dividing the
in-degree into four quartiles and counting the packets in each quartile for each host.
Secondly, normal users have complete freedom in choosing the type of services, and the com-
bination of such services can also be considered as normal behaviors. Therefore, we preserve
all the service attributes for node profiling. Within each application/destination, several pos-
sible parameter candidates (e.g. number of connections, number of packets sent or number of
bytes sent) can be further used to characterize the relative interest on application/destination
choice of the node behavior. Among these parameters, the number of packets or bytes sent are
much more accurate than the number of connections to represent node behaviors, as it is very
likely that two nodes having different interests on a destination/application may have similar
number of connections (but different bytes or packets sent). Further, as bytes mainly represent
the accumulated level of packets, we believe the node behavior can be better characterized by
the packets sent rather than the bytes sent. In addition, the number of packets is also used in
other profiling schemes, including [21] [4].
Further, we consider the total amount of traffic (in bytes) generated and received using tgi
and tri for host i. Thus the redefined xi,t for host i at time t is:
xi,t = {(pkti,j,t, tgi,t, tri,t, pktd,i,t)|1 ≤ i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤M, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ d ≤ 4}
By simplifying the problem in this way, we can reduce the complexity of analysis without losing
too much information about normal node behaviors.
2.3.3 Behavior Clustering
To find out the common behavior profiles/clusters shared by different nodes, clustering is
used in a way such that behavior correlations between times and different nodes are jointly
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considered. In other words, we aim at finding the common profiles/clusters among all the xi,ts
in the corresponding network.
Consequently, we first identify the active hosts initiating the connection, because those
hosts are the sources of most, if not all, network events 1. We use the method described in [8]
to identify the active hosts, which is based on the SYN packet. At the same time, we calculate
the in-degree of each destination, and sort those destinations by their in-degrees. Then, at a
fixed time interval, we calculate the values of the attributes for each active host, which is xi,t
in the problem statement.
We further remove the xi,ts with tri,t equal to 0. By doing so, we can easily remove 1)
the inactive xi,ts, that generates nothing in the corresponding time interval, 2) incorrectly
configured hosts, that may continuously send packets but get no response and 3) scanning
hosts that do not get a response in the time interval. We also remove the traffic from ports
rarely seen in the network (less than 1% of the total traffic). Doing this way, we can preserve
the main characteristics of behaviors. Finally, we compute the log values of those attributes.
As we do not have a prior knowledge on how many clusters of behavior in the network, we
use agglomerative clustering [6] to find possible clusters. The classic agglomerative clustering
algorithm treats each xi,t as a cluster at the beginning, then calculated the pairwise distance
for any two points (or xi,ts), and combined two points or clusters into one cluster if the distance
between them is below a threshold Th. The criterion to compare the distance on combining
clusters is the largest distance. The distance is measured by the extended Jaccard distance
which is defined as [11]:
d(x1, x2) = 1− x
′
1x2
||x1||2 + ||x2||2 − x′1x2
The extended Jaccard distanced measures the degree of difference between two points. It
also accounts both for angle as well as magnitude, so it outperforms Euclidean distance as
shown in [11] in web-page clustering. It is also widely used in gene analysis [12] and automatic
detection of malwares [123].
1in practice, removing scanning traffic and other known malicious traffic should be done at the very beginning,
removal had been done in [10] for the data set under consideration in this Chapter
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2.3.4 Metrics to Measure the Abnormal Change of Node Behaviors
In general, abnormal behaviors could coexist with normal ones. By coexist, we mean
the abnormal behaviors can not only be generated together with normal behaviors from an
individual node, but also associate with other normal node behaviors in a network. In contrast,
in our study, the behavior profiles are of different popularity (as shown in Chapter 2.4) and
popular behaviors have relatively large sizes. Therefore, if there is a certain number of hosts
infected by a malware, these popular behaviors will be impacted.
To measure the change of popular behaviors, intra-cluster distance, behavior profile size or
its proportion value are among the possible candidate metrics. This is because when abnormal
behaviors are present, two possible scenarios would happen for popular behaviors: one is that
there are other normal behaviors which are closer to those infected behaviors, causing the
change in size (hence proportion) of popular behavior profiles; the other is that the original
behavior is still the closest one to those infected behaviors, but the intra-cluster distance is
much larger. In the literature, there is no study to measure the proportion change of node
behaviors, so we will mainly focus on the characteristics of this metric when worm is present.
In addition, as shown in the evaluation part, unlike behavior profile size, the proportion value
can be fitted in a well-know statistical model.
On the other hand, although many studies including [8] consider the intra-cluster distance
as a metric in detection, they are mainly based on certain heuristics rather than well-grounded
statistical models. Consequently, given the node behaviors are different in different networks;
it is hard to apply the heuristics to be universally suitable to different networks. In addition,
it is also difficult to control the false positive rates. We will propose new solutions for this
problem in Chapter 4.
2.3.5 Discussions
To achieve meaningful and representative behavior clusters, we need a small Th. However, if
Th is too small, the clusters identified are of very small size. In the extreme case, each behavior
is a cluster, which makes it hard to analysis network traffic at the user level. Therefore, a proper
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Th is needed.
In our experiments, we find that behavior profiles are of different popularity (as the case
in our analyzed data shown in Chapter 2.4), and we especially want this popular behavior
profiles to be meaningful and stable to help the analysis. Therefore, we propose the following
heuristic to find the proper Th: First find the largest l (l = 4 in our evaluations) clusters as
the major clusters; instead of using only one threshold, we choose different threshold values,
check the intra-cluster distances of the corresponding major clusters under each threshold, we
then pick the largest Th after which at least r major clusters are stable (r ≤ l). In the next
section, we will give an detailed example on finding the proper Th. We apply this heuristic to
different subnets from real enterprise network trace and find that generally the choice of Th is
within [0.2, 0.3].
With the behavior profiles identified, it is straightforward to build node behavior profiles
for each node in the network. In detail, after identifying the representative profiles (A1...Ak),
for any future observed behavior within certain time interval, we could find the closest Ai to
it, as well as its deviation δ to Ai. That is, any node behavior can be recorded as two tuples
(Ai, δ). A node profile may consist of a set of such two tuples. With just two parameters
corresponding to the underlying behavior profiles to represent the node behavior in the future,
the profile generated by our approach is concise and meaningful.
Another issue of this approach is the scalability problem during clustering. As the sample
size n increases, n2 distances need to be calculated for clustering. Recently, in [123], a scalable
clustering scheme has been proposed which avoids calculations of n2 distances, it is mainly
based on locality sensitive hashing (LSH), since LSH provides a sublinear solution to the
approximate nearest neighbor problem (ǫ−NNS) [123]. Consequently, it is shown that the fast
scheme is able to cluster more than 75 thousand samples in less than three hours. Therefore, a
similar idea can be also applied in our approach, and we will consider it in our further studies.
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2.4 Evaluations
2.4.1 Trace Information
We consider the LBNL enterprise trace data [10] which is publicly available and the latest
enterprise traces to evaluate our approaches in this and following Chapters. The total traces
are over 100 hours and cover 8,000 internal active addresses at the Lawrence Berkeley National
Laboratory and 47,000 external addresses. As mentioned in [10], unlike a site’s Internet traffic,
which we can generally record by monitoring a single access link, an enterprise of significant
size lacks a single choke-point for its internal traffic. Therefore, in the LBNL trace collection
[10], the authors mainly recorded the traffic from different subnets by monitoring (one at a
time) the enterprise’s two central routers.
To capture the traffic, four NICs are used for four unidirectional traffic streams for two
subnets. Timestamps are further used to merge each two unidirectional streams of one subnet
into one trace. The four NICs then switch periodically such that they are able to capture
traffic traces from 18-22 different subnets, with most traces being one hour long. We then
choose several traces from different subnets (each subnet consists of multiple one-hour traces)
as the training data, and other traces of the same subnet as the testing data.
Specifically, we consider the trace data captured in subnet002, subnet005, subnet017, sub-
net018 and subnet021 in this work (for clear representation, we replace the prefix port in the
origin paper with subnet). The results on traces of different subnets are similar. As an exam-
ple, we present one of them in the section, which is based on subnet002 in the LBNL trace.
There are six traces for subnet002, which in total is 1.64 GB, over four hours long and consists
of over 130 source nodes in total. In addition, since the trace data does not include the traffic
within its own subnet, we only evaluate our approach by the traffic from and to the subnet
of subnet002. The time interval used to extract node behavior is 10 minutes. To identify the
services used in the subnet, wireshark [14] is used.
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2.4.2 A Detailed Example
To illustrate how our approach works, we first give a detailed example on one trace, which
is trace 1526(0107).
2.4.2.1 Determination of Th
The dendrogram in Fig. 2.2 illustrates the general relationship among all the behaviors in
the training data. Clearly, the dendrogram indicates certain structure among those behaviors,
which means that profiling by jointly considering both time and node correlation yields mean-
ingful behavior clusters. In Fig. 2.2, we can find there are many potential Th values that can
be used for clustering. However, the dendrogram alone can not tell us which Th is proper in
this network. Therefore, we need to find a proper value of Th so as to find good representations
of those behaviors.
Figure 2.2 Corresponding dendrogram Figure 2.3 Intra-cluster distance over Th
We apply the heuristic discussed in the previous section to find a proper value for Th. It
is illustrated in Fig. 2.3 and 2.4, where we plot the cluster properties when Th is from 0.25 to
0.15, down at 0.02 interval.
To be specific, Fig. 2.3 and 2.4 illustrate the change of intra-cluster distance and cluster
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Figure 2.4 Cluster size over Th Figure 2.5 Cluster sizes at Th = 0.21
size at different Th values. We can find that, the most significant change happens when Th
value changes from 0.25 to 0.23, and 0.23 to 0.21, but there is no significant change after
that (except for cluster 2). This is also true on cluster size change. In addition, given the
intra-cluster distances of these clusters are very small, these clusters can be considered tightly
coupled. Therefore, by setting r = 3 and l = 4, we find a proper Th which is 0.21 in this case.
2.4.2.2 Compression and Representation
Table 2.2 illustrates the compact representation of our methods. We list four largest traces
(each is one hour long) of subnet002. The number before the bracket indicates the capture
time, while the number in the bracket indicates the capture date. We define the compression
ratio as the ratio of the total number of records of active nodes (uncompressed data) over the
clusters identified (compressed data). The coverage is defined as the fraction of data used for
clustering over the total number of data (similar to [5]). Since we consider both the number
of bytes and packets generated by a node, the coverage is further divided into byte coverage
and packet coverage. Finally, we pool all four traces and do clustering for the pooled trace;
the result is shown in the overall column. To achieve a fair comparison, we set the distance
threshold Th to be 0.21 for all traces.
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Table 2.2 Compression and representation ratio
trace information
0209(1215) 2146(1215) 1626(0106) 1526(0107) overall
compression ratio
19.45 24.06 12.48 8.69 21.68
packet coverage
98.11% 97.38% 96.29% 96.36% 97.23%
byte coverage
99.75% 99.99% 99.85% 97.53% 99.89%
From Table 2.2, we can find all the compression ratios are around or larger than 9. This
means all behaviors across different nodes at different time intervals can be represented by
about 12% (or less) behavior clusters of different types. The variations in these ratios indicate
the activity diversity of the subnet at different times, e.g. high diversity in activities is expected
in the day time, leading to low compression ratio. Consequently, the high compression ratio
in each trace suggests certain overlap of behaviors within each trace.
On the other hand, all the coverage ratios are larger than 96%, which means our approach
captures the majority of the node behaviors in this network. Moreover, since each trace is of
same length in time, and the number of records in each trace used for clustering is similar, the
relative higher compression and coverage ratio in the pooled trace (overall column) indicates
the existence of behaviors overlap across different times in the same subnet. This also means
the behavior profiles are stable across different times for a network. The results are similar
when applying our approach to traces of other subnets. Hence it is reasonable to conclude (at
least for the traces we have analyzed) that node behaviors in a network have correlations in
both time and node domain, and clustering on behavior is effective.
2.4.2.3 Cluster Behavior Information
Fig. 2.5 shows the detailed cluster information when setting Th = 0.21 for trace 1526(0107).
In general, we can find large variation of cluster sizes, indicating their relative popularities.
There are six clusters whose sizes are over 10. There is one dominant cluster indicating the
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dominant behavior in this subnet (according to our analysis, different subnets tend to have
different dominant clusters).
We then take a further look into the details of each cluster, and try to associate the real
user pattern with each cluster. In particular, the main behavior in the largest cluster (id 1)
is printing, with a large amount (around 3 in logscale, we will use logscale in the following
analysis) of traffic going through the TCP 631 port (IPP protocol), coupled with a very small
amount of IMAP (0.4) traffic. A majority of packets are directed to the destinations Q3 with
large total traffic size in both incoming and outgoing directions. This suggests that, in this
subnet during capturing period, the major behavior is printing associated with minor behaviors
on email. Almost all behaviors are interested in the Q3 destinations. This is not surprising;
as printing is a pretty normal task in such enterprise network and people would do something
else while waiting for the printing results.
Some other clusters (id 7, 12, 15, 24 and 27) also have major behavior in generating IPP
traffic, but they either generate much less IPP traffic than cluster 1 or have other major parallel
applications. To be specific, the IPP traffic is around 2 less in cluster 12 and 27, and 0.4 less in
cluster 15 and 24 respectively; additional HTTP traffic is generated in cluster 15 and 24, while
HTTPs traffic is generated in cluster 7. Moreover, IMAPs traffic is much larger in cluster 24
and 27, and cluster 27 also generates traffic on port 8372, which is unassigned according to [124]
and [125] (it might be the port for Trojan NetBoy.100 [126], it could also be the service port
specifically used for that subnet, we will consider this issue in our future work). In addition,
the choice of destinations is also different, a notable portion of traffic in cluster 7 is directed
to destinations in Q1; cluster 24 is interested in destinations of all categories, and cluster 27
shows interest in destination Q1, Q3 and Q4, with a major interest in Q1. Especially, the
packets from port 8372 seem to be entirely generated to Q1.
Another notable behavior is cluster 4. Unlike those behaviors in cluster 1, the major
behaviors in cluster 4 are HTTP (around 2.2) and IMAPs (around 1.2), with large total traffic
size in both incoming and outgoing directions. Less than half of the traffic in cluster 2 is
directed to destination Q3 and more than half of the traffic is directed to destination Q1. This
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represents one of the typical uses of HTTP, and the choice of destination Q1 and Q3 indicates
information on user preference of HTTP and Email destinations.
Cluster 5, 8, 16 and 24 are similar to cluster 4 in generating similar amount of HTTP and
Email packets. This is also true for cluster 9, 19 and 29, except no email packets are generated
in these clusters. On the other hand, cluster 5 differs from cluster 4 mainly in the choice of
destinations, where cluster 5 mainly generates packets to destination Q1 and Q4. Cluster 8
generates additional SSH packets, and the amount of SSH packets is similar to that of HTTP
traffic. Cluster 9 and 19 differ from cluster 4 as they only generate HTTP traffic to destination
Q4. Additional HTTPs traffic is generated in cluster 16, and the choice of destination is across
all four destination categories.
In addition, cluster 3 is fairly quiet. Clusters 18 generates nfs (or shilp) traffic to destination
Q2, while cluster 23 generates additional ssh traffic to Q1, Q2 and Q3. Cluster 2 and 26 only
generate netbios-ssn traffic but different in volume and destinations (destination Q1 for cluster
2, destination Q1 and Q2 for cluster 26), which we believe is an automatic host behavior in
the subnet. Cluster 10, 14, 17, 20, 21 and 30 generate mainly IMAPs traffic but differ in traffic
volumes and selection of destinations. To summarize, all such clusters suggest the scenario
of people doing their jobs in this subnet, but with different preferences in terms of additional
associated services and popularity of destinations.
We also include the details of centroids of trace 1526(0107) in Appendix A.1 in this the-
sis. In brief, most results obtained by the proposed approach are explainable as reasonable
user/computer behavior, suggesting the effectiveness of our approach. In addition, Table 2.3
shows how hosts jump between behaviors from time to time (0 means no activity in that time
interval). We list the first five hosts with largest out-degree, it is very clear that some hosts
dynamically jump from clusters to clusters, while some are stable on some specific behaviors.
We also summarize the proportion of hosts that remain in 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 clusters within
one hour time interval in Table 2.4. It is clear that around 49% nodes are relatively stable,
because they only stay within one cluster, while about 51% of nodes are relatively dynamic,
jumping between 2 to 4 clusters in the 1 hour time interval.
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Table 2.3 Node behaviors at different time intervals
node index cluster id
1 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 15)
2 (10, 24, 5, 5, 27, 27)
3 (4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)
4 (16, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8)
5 (10, 10, 5, 5, 0, 0)
Table 2.4 Summary of node activities in terms clusters within one hour
1 cluster 2 clusters 3 clusters 4 clusters 5 or 6 clusters
48.89% 20.00% 17.78% 13.33% 0%
2.4.2.4 Cluster Properties
To illustrate the distinct nature of the behaviors, we plot the average intra-cluster and
inter-cluster distances for each cluster, as well as the corresponding standard deviations in Fig.
2.6 and Fig. 2.7. As shown in Fig. 2.7, each cluster can be well separated. Moreover, from Fig.
2.6, the intra-cluster distances of all the clusters are very small. However, there are clusters
with 0 standard deviation, this is because the cluster only has size 1. There are two possible
reasons: 1) the training data is not large enough to cover all those behaviors, or 2) the behavior
is so rare and has no one similar to it. For example, the behavior in cluster 30 (with cluster
size 1) is sending and receiving huge traffic (mainly on IMAPs) which is not common. One
important observation is, the relatively small intra-cluster distance and standard deviation of
some major clusters indicates the behavior in those clusters are tightly coupled and stable,
which is useful in detecting abnormal behaviors if we can monitor the intra-cluster distance
change in those stable clusters in future data set.
2.4.2.5 Detecting Worm Propagation
We generate simulated worm traffic (similar to [23]) as an initial test. To do so, we randomly
pick up one time interval t1 from another data set (trace 1626(0106)), we call the original
training data set t0. In t1, in addition to generating normal traffic, all the hosts generate
certain amount of worm traffic for propagation. This is the situation where a new worm is
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Figure 2.6 Intra-cluster distance & std Figure 2.7 Inter-cluster distance & std
spread out from an initial set of nodes (e.g. existing botnet).
To be specific, in addition to the normal traffic, we let all the active hosts in this interval
generate worm behavior which uses one of the common TCP ports 21, 25, 80, 135 and 139
for propagation (e.g. W32.Blaster, Nimda, etc.) with small payload (5-15KB), low random
scanning speed (5 hosts/minute), and 0.5% chance to find another vulnerable host for infection.
In addition, we considered all the destinations chosen by worm are from the destinations in the
training data. Therefore, the connection failure rate will be very small. In brief, we simulate
a very stealthy worm for the environment.
We then check the cluster size distribution for the infected case, and compare them to
the normal case. Fig. 2.8 shows the cluster size distribution of worm behaviors coupled with
normal behaviors of t1. Basically, the pattern of the cluster size distribution for t1 is different
to Fig. 2.5. We also calculate the proportion value of the first largest 6 behavior profiles, which
are cluster 1 to 6 respectively. Further, we compare these values with the ones in the training
data in a statistical way. That is, let pi be the estimate of the proportion of behavior i in the
node profiling from training data t0, since the training data is large enough, the estimate can
be considered accurate. Then considering any new time interval t1 as a random sample from
the same population, we can run the population proportion test (population proportion testing
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Figure 2.8 Cluster sizes with worm present Figure 2.9 Intra-cluster distance
[26]) on p′i for sample t1 to check if p
′
i = pi, or find the acceptance region for ith behavior.
In practice, the acceptance region is of special interest, since once we know the number of
records in sample t1, the acceptance region can be directly derived and used for detection: if
the number of records in behavior i is out of the range of its acceptance region, there is an
indication of abnormal behaviors. Given the number of active nodes in this network is small,
we mainly apply the small sample case test in [26]. The acceptance region [a, b] at a given
significance level α is given by [26]:
α/2 ≤ Bino(a;n, pi) (2.1)
Bino(b− 1;n, pi) ≤ 1− α/2 (2.2)
For example, we calculate that p1 = 0.175 for cluster 1 in t0. Given the total sample size
of t1 76 in Fig. 2.8, at significance level α = 0.05, we can find the acceptance region is within
[7, 20] for cluster 1. Similarly, we can find the acceptance regions for cluster 2 to 6 which are
listed in Table 2.5.
From Table 2.5, it is easy to tell cluster 1, 4, 5 and 6 in Fig. 2.8 are within the acceptance
region at α = 0.05. However, cluster 2 and 3 are not within the acceptance region for the time
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interval considered. They are within the rejection region, indicating the existence of abnormal
behaviors.
Table 2.5 Acceptance regions for cluster 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, α = 0.05
sample t1 (Fig. 2.8)
cluster 1 7 ∈ [7, 20]
cluster 2 1 /∈ [2, 11]
cluster 3 0 /∈ [1, 10]
cluster 4 1 ∈ [1, 10]
cluster 5 2 ∈ [1, 9]
cluster 6 4 ∈ [1, 8]
Further, when looking into the intra-cluster distance distribution (cluster 1 and 6 for exam-
ple), as shown in Fig. 2.9, the intra-cluster distance distributions of cluster 1 and cluster 6 of
the worm case are much higher than the normal case, which also indicates abnormal behaviors.
Especially, since cluster 1 is quite tightly coupled and the intra-cluster distance is always less
than 0.1 in our experiment, the change in the intra-cluster distance provides much informa-
tion about the simulated abnormal behaviors. On the other hand, considering the threshold
we choose is 0.21, the large intra-cluster distance in cluster 6 also suggests the existence of
abnormal behaviors.
In addition, the intra-cluster distances are also very large for cluster 25 and 29, but it is out
of the scope of this research. We also simulate different worms by adjusting the spreading speed
and payload size, in most cases, there will be changes in both proportion test and intra-cluster
distances. Therefore, given the specific subnet profiles, our initial study shows it is possible to
detect worm existence during its propagation. We can then look into the suspicious records
for further analysis.
2.4.3 False Positive Rates
As different networks tend to have different characteristics, to test the false positive rates
when proportion value is used for detection, in addition to subnet002, we consider multiple
subnet traces each of which is of two-hour long (combining two one-hour long traces), ranging
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Table 2.6 Proportion test results (1: reject; 0: not reject)
trace cluster id results trace cluster id results
subnet002 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) subnet003 (1,2,3) (1,0,0)
subnet005 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) subnet006 (1,2,3) (0,1,0)
subnet008 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) subnet010 (1,2,3) (0,0,0)
subnet015 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) subnet017 (1,2,3) (0,0,0)
subnet018 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) subnet021 (1,2,3) (0,0,0)
subnet024 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) subnet026 (1,2,3) (0,0,0)
overall false positive rate
0.0556
from 100 to 1100 nodes. In addition, we preserve all the application attributes identified in
the profiling and consider the first 3 popular behavior profiles for the test. We use the last
time interval in each trace as the testing data, and the rest data as the training data. The test
results are listed in Table 2.6.
From Table 2.6, 2 out of 36 times (2/36 = 0.0556) that the test wrongly rejects the null
hypothesis, which is not far from the significance level at α = 0.05. Especially, the first
popular behavior in subnet003 and the second popular behavior in subnet006 wrongly reject
the hypothesis for the proportion test. But other results do show certain stability of the
proportion metric.
We also apply our approach to detect the worm behavior in the above subnet traces. We
use the same method described in the previous part to generate worm behavior in the last
time interval of each trace, and use the left intervals of the same trace as the training data.
An alert is generated if at least one out of three popular clusters fails to pass the test. The
results are encouraging, as our approach can detect the existence of worm for all the traces in
the experiments.
2.5 Conclusion and Discussions
In this Chapter, based on the observation of behavior correlation across the nodes and
times, we proposed a correlation based node profiling approach for network traffic analysis.
We also considered a heuristic to find a proper distance threshold to cluster the host behaviors
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at different time intervals. The analysis on the real user data from the enterprise network
suggests that it is easy to understand the node behavior using the proposed approach.
In addition, we also obtain several important observations:
1. The node behaviors are correlated across different times and nodes, which is consistent
with our observation made in the beginning of this Chapter;
2. The node behavior profiles are of different popularities, this is consistent with the fact
that the Internet destinations and applications are of different popularities;
3. At least part of the popular behavior profiles tend to be tightly coupled in terms of shorter
intra-cluster distance, this is also consistent with the fact that general user operations
(represented by our behavior profiles) on popular destinations and services tend to be
similar (e.g. operations in printing or browsing a popular website like CNN), although
they may be different in content (e.g. content of printing and detailed news browsed).
Such stable behavior profiles can be further used for detection.
A consequent question based on the above observations is that, as nodes have different
behavior types, does the traffic generated by different behaviors share the same characteristics
or not? In the literature, most recent traffic generators model the traffic from the application
level. That is, application is considered as the source of the network traffic. Models based on
either individual applications or application mix are further proposed. However, as we can find
in the common node behavior cycle discussed in this Chapter, the network traffic is not driven
by applications, but node behaviors of different types. Consequently, modeling the network
traffic from the node behavior perspective should yield better models in generating realistic
network traffic. On the other hand, as extensive work has been done in traffic modeling, it will
save much time if we can incorporate previous work with the node behavior based modeling.
We will address these issues in Chapter 5.
In this Chapter, we further considered detection metrics based on statistical test for worm
propagation. Our example on real user data suggests that the profiles have the potential to
detect abnormal behaviors in the network when coupling with the statistical test. Moreover,
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we calculate the false positive rates of the proposed detection scheme using different subnets
in the trace data and achieve good performance. In practice, depending on the speed of the
worm propagation, different significance level can be selected to adjust the sensitivity of the
proposed detection scheme.
On the other hand, given the aimless nature in scanning and large payload in exploit
during the worm propagation, potentially there are many ways to detect the existence of its
propagation. For example, both measurement of proportion change and intra-cluster distance
change in different behavior profiles will generate an alarm.
However, the detection scheme alone is not suitable to detect the C&C channel in botnets,
especially P2P botnets. This is because that usually the bots in the botnet know whom to
communicate with, and the command is small in size as compared to worm payload. Moreover,
the bots can also generate additional traffic to mimic the normal behavior when doing C&C.
Consequently, the change caused by the C&C behavior may not be significantly enough to
generate the alarm by the same approaches used for worm detection. Therefore, more advanced
approaches have to be designed to detect the existence of the C&C channel, which will be
discussed in Chapter 4. In the mean time, understanding of different botnets is also important
to design the corresponding detection approaches, and we will discuss it in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3. A Framework for P2P Botnets
Botnets, like worms in the past, are the most serious danger towards the Internet. To
effectively protect against them, researchers should not only focus on the known ones, but also
the inherent relationships among them and those to appear in the future. In this Chapter,
we first propose a framework capable of characterizing the inherent relationships between all
different kinds of current (existing and suggested in the literature) botnets as well as worms.
Based on the proposed framework, we predict a new botnet that is called Loosely Coupled
P2P Botnet (lcbot). It is stealthy and can be considered as an extension of the existing P2P
botnet structures. We then conduct experiments to compare the performances between lcbot
and other P2P botnets in the literature, and gain insight understanding of P2P botnets. We
also discuss potential mechanisms to detect the existence of P2P botnets. To the best of our
knowledge, we are the first to propose the framework for botnets, the lcbot concept in P2P
botnet research.
3.1 Introduction
A bot is common parlance on the Internet for a software program that is a software agent
[32]. Traditionally, a botnet refers to a collection of bots, which are compromised machines
running programs such as worms, Trojan horses, or backdoors under a common command and
control (C&C) infrastructure. A botnet’s controller/botmaster (real person controlling the
botnets) usually controls a group of bots remotely for nefarious purposes.
One of the main advantages of botnet usage is that bots can utilize different combinations of
existing advanced malware techniques easily, such as keylogging and rootkit. Moreover, by use
of exploitation or social engineering approaches such as email and instant messages, the botnet
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can self propagate on the Internet to increase its size like worms. In contrast, unlike worms
which are usually out of anyone’s control during propagation, botnets are much smarter that
they can be controled by the botmaster, or sold to people who wants to use them. Therefore,
it is widely believed to become the platform for many current attacks towards the Internet.
To make effective countermeasures against botnets, it is very important to not only study
the existing ones of various kinds separately, but the inherent relationships among different
botnets/worms (since most current botnets make use of worms to propagate), as well as the
ones to appear in the future. There are several papers in the literature each of which designs
a new botnet of some special kind [38] [42] [65], but none of them considered the inherent
relationship between the botnet they designed with other existing botnets and worms, nor did
they designed any experiments to compare different P2P botnets.
In this chapter, we address the above issues and make the following contributions:
1. Propose a general botnet framework for understanding worm and botnet of different
kinds;
2. Predict a new lcbot from the botnet framework, and propose a propagation scheme by
modifying an existing scheme in the literature;
3. Propose new metrics for botnet evaluations, use them with known ones to compare the
performance of the new botnet with other known P2P botnets.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the framework for botnets/worms,
the lcbot concept in botnet and related fields. The Chapter is organized as follows: we first give
a brief overview of botnets and the related work in the literature in Chapter 3.2. In Chapter
3.3, we propose a general framework which can characterize worms and botnets of various
kinds. Based on the framework, we predict a new botnet called Loosely Coupled P2P Botnet.
We also discuss the evaluation metrics and propagation methods for lcbot in this section. In
Chapter 3.4, we evaluate the performance of lcbot with other P2P botnets proposed in the
literature. We also discuss possible ways to detect the existence of botnet. The conclusion is
made in Chapter 3.5.
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3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Botnet Overview
In the past several years, different kinds of botnet have been designed and captured. Table
3.1 lists several examples of well known botnets according to their first appearance in the wild.
Table 3.1 An example of well-known botnet history (slightly updated from
[97])
Date Name C&C protocol Structure
2002/04 SDbot IRC Centralized
2002/10 Agobot IRC Centralized
2003/04 Spybot IRC Centralized
2004 Rbot IRC Centralized
2004/03 Phatbot WASTE P2P
2004/05 Bobax HTTP Centralized
2006/04 Nugache Random P2P
2008/03 Kraken Self-defined Centralized
2009/05 Torpig HTTP Centralized
According to [33], the damages of botnets can be classified as follows:
• Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) Attacks: The botnet can be used to launch DDoS
attacks against any Internet system such as a web server. The purpose of the DDoS
attack is to use up all system resources (e.g. bandwidth) so that the system can no
longer provide available services to normal users. According to our source code analysis
of well-known botnets, the attacks can be in the format of Ping flood, UDP flood, spoofed
UDP flood, spoofed SYN flood, HTTP flood, etc.. It is believed that all DDoS attacks
are launched through botnets [97], and they are very hard to prevent and defend against,
because of the size, the accumulated bandwidth, and the distributed nature of the botnet.
• Spamming: Each day, the spam accounts for several billion spam messages [97] in Internet
traffic and is used to frustrate, confuse and annoy Internet users. According to [98], more
than 95% emails on the Internet are spam. Consequently, given the size and distributed
nature of botnets, most of these spam messages are believed to be sent from botnets. In
41
addition, some bots also implement a special function to harvest email addresses, and
it is often the case that the spam you are receiving was sent from, e.g. grandma’s old
Windows computer sitting at home [33], your workmates or friends.
• Sniffing Traffic: The bot on the compromised machine can use packet sniffer to watch for
interesting clear-text data and gather sensitive information like usernames and passwords.
In addition, other interesting information can also be gathered. For example, if the
compromised machine belongs to two or more different botnets (infected more than once),
it is possible to gather the key information of the other botnet, and steal it.
• Keylogging: When encrypted communications (e.g. HTTPS or POP3S) are used in
compromised machines, sniffing alone is of little use as no key is available to decrypt
the packets. Keylogging is then used to retrieve sensitive information like credit card
number, passwords in this situation. For example, an implemented filtering mechanism
(e.g. ”I am only interested in key sequences near the keyword ’paypal.com’”) further
helps in stealing secret data [33].
• Spreading new malware: Usually, to avoid the slow start phase, new malwares can be
spread on top of the existing botnet. Lacking of slow start phase makes the new malware
spread much easier and cause more harm. For example, the Witty worm, which attacked
the ICQ protocol parsing implementation in Internet Security Systems (ISS) products is
suspected to have been initially launched by a botnet due to the fact that the attacking
hosts were not running any ISS services [33].
• Clickfraud (Installing Advertisement Addons, Browser Helper Objects and Google Ad-
Sense abuse): With large size and distributed nature, botnets can also help the botmaster
to make profit easily by clicking the online ads. These clicks can be launched by receiving
the corresponding command from the botmaster. Moreover, this process can be further
enhanced if the bot hijacks the start-page of a compromised machine so that the ”clicks”
are executed each time the victim uses the browser [33].
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• Attacking IRC Chat Networks: As most centralized botnets are based on IRC for C&C,
they can be used to attack the IRC network. It is similar to DDoS attack, with the
purpose to shut down the victim IRC network by massive service requests.
• Manipulating online polls/games: The bots can disguise to be different identities to win
the game or poll. Given each bot having a distinct IP address, every vote will have the
same credibility as a vote cast by a real person [33]. Online games can be manipulated
in a similar way.
• Phishing (Mass identity theft): By sending spam emails that pretend to be legitimate
(such as fake PayPal or banks), criminals usually trick normal users to visit the fake
phishing sites (hosted by bots) so as to gather sensitive user information like user-
names/passwords and credit card numbers on the real websites. This is the combination
of different functionalities described above.
Traditionally, DDoS and Spamming are usually highly concerned. However, more and more
applications from Clickfraud to Phishing are being used for profit purposes. For example, ac-
cording to ClickForensics (http://www.clickforensics.com), traffic from botnets was responsible
for 31.4% of all click fraud traffic in Q4 2008. That’s up from the 27.7% rate reported for Q3
2008 and the 22.0% rate reported for Q2 2008.
In addition, we have also included our study on SDbot and Agobot source codes in Fig.
B.1 B.2 C.1 in Appendix 2 and 3. In brief, besides the damages mentioned above, from
our analysis on the source codes of Agobot and Sdbot, we found the botmaster in Sdbot
(with NB spreader) is interested in the Cdkeys like Half-Life CDKey, CSKEY, Neverwinter
Nights CDKey. In general, there is usually more than one botmaster controlling the botnet,
our analysis shows one version of Sdbot allows up to four botmasters to control the IRC
channel simultaneously. This feature increases the botnet usage and makes it much harder for
traceback. Other notable observations from the source code analysis include that in Agobot,
up to four propagation methods are used, including scan.netbios, scan.locator, scan.dcom, and
scan.dcom2; it will find and kill any antivirus processes in its list every 10 seconds if it fails to
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join the IRC channel.
3.2.2 Centralized Botnets
Current research on botnets mainly focuses on the behavior of centralized botnets, such as
IRC or HTTP based botnets. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the typical life cycle of an IRC based botnet.
There are mainly 5 steps in the botnet operation [127]. Vulnerable hosts are first infected
by bots in the origin botnet; the infection can make use of any existing techniques (worms,
Trojan horses, etc). As the IRC server may be detected, shut down; no hard IP address is
embedded in infected hosts. Instead, only a domain name is embedded, which requires hosts
after infection to first use DNS to find the IRC server. Then, infected hosts connect to the IRC
server to join the IRC channel under the botmaster’s control. The botmaster is the creator of
the IRC channel, who can then issue commands to listening bots. In addition to common IRC
messages, the bots in the same channel will automatically parse and execute the command
(usually in the format of private messages) from the botmaster. Authorization is achieved via
a channel password. For HTTP based botnet, it differs from the IRC based botnet in the last
step, where the HTTP bots will visit the server via HTTP protocol from time to time to check
the latest command from the botmaster.
Recently, a new type of centralized botnet named Torpig [96] is captured and reported in
the literature. It is also a centralized botnet, but with slight variations. According to [96],
to increase the reliability of its C&C infrastructure, Torpig uses a more advanced technique
which is called domain flux by the authors. With domain flux, each bot periodically and
independently (but by the same algorithm and parameter values) generates a list of domains
that it contacts. The first host that sends a reply that identifies it as a valid C&C server is
considered genuine, until the next period of domain generation is started [96]. Therefore, given
the same algorithm and parameter values used to generate the server list in each bot, all the
bots will share the same list and check the same server at similar times. The botmaster can
issue any command whenever needed, as long as he knows the corresponding time and server
lists. By controlling a wild Torpig botnet for over ten days, the authors in [96] make several
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Figure 3.1 Typical (IRC) infection cycle (modified from [127])
important and latest observations on centralized botnets:
• They found that previous evaluations of botnet sizes based on the count of distinct IPs
might be grossly overestimated. In particular, they found that the number of unique IP
was one order of magnitude larger than the actual number of infected hosts.
• The victims of botnets are users with poorly maintained machines that choose easily
guessable passwords to protect access to sensitive sites.
• The botnet targets a variety of applications, and gathers a rich and diverse set of in-
formation from the infected victims, such as bank accounts, credit card numbers and
username and password pairs.
3.2.3 Advanced Botnets
Despite the advances in centralized botnets, many new features of botnets have been dis-
cussed in the recent literature, which make the existing countermeasures less effective. For
example, in addition to P2P structures, encryption, use of multiple protocols for C&C are also
within the main directions of the evolution. Encryption makes it more secure for a botmaster to
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control the botnet, resulting in the inefficacy of schemes based on signatures or anomaly detec-
tions using character distribution (e.g. n-gram distribution). Normally, symmetric encryption
is expected, but it is possible to make use of the PKI structure [128].
C&C by other commonly used protocols makes the communication among bots more covert
[129]. Consequently, there are reports of botnets using Skype [61] and Gmail [62] in C&C. It
is also possible that a botnet could use multiple protocols for one C&C cycle [129], making
detection even more difficult. In Table 3.2, we summarize and compare the differences between
latest and traditional botnets. In this chapter, we mainly focus on the discussion of the C&C
structure of botnets. And the predicted botnet is believed to be compatible with the encryption
and variation in C&C protocols discussed above.
In contrast, P2P structure makes the botnet robust and resilient to bot removal/repair.
Therefore, several schemes for constructing different P2P botnets are proposed as hybridbot
[65], randombot [38] and superbot [42]. [31] lists the timeline of captured botnets using P2P.
The main idea of P2P botnets is that each bot has a “buddy list” or routing information (we
replace these terms with peerlist in this thesis) consisting of IP addresses of n other infected
hosts. The peerlist in randombot is built in the following way [38]: When an infected host i
infects a new victim j, its peerlist is passed to the victim. Host i chooses with a probability
whether or not to replace one IP address in its own peerlist with host j’s IP address. If host
j has already been infected before, host j updates a part of its own peerlist with the new one
sent from host i. The peerlist construction of supernode in [42] is similar to [38] except that
only client nodes can infect supernodes and entire peerlist information is exchanged.
Further, the botnets discussed above can be considered as “PUSH” based botnets. In con-
trast, the idea of botnet structure in [65] is similar to [42], except that the clients periodically
communicate with any servant bot in their peerlist to grab the command. This can be consid-
ered as “PULL” based botnet. However, it is expected that the periodical connection in [65]
yields extra information on detection and unexpected latency in command delivery. Therefore,
in this Chapter, after building the framework for all the existing botnets and worms, we mainly
concentrate on the evaluations of “PUSH” based botnets.
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The most similar work in the literature is in [35], the authors in [35] did a thorough study
on botnet structures and show that random botnet is highly resistant to different removals.
However, they focus more on the structure difference of the known botnets. Our work focuses
on the underlying relationship among different botnet structures proposed in the literature and
can be considered as an extension of the previous work.
Table 3.2 Evolution of bot techniques
Traditional Evolution
Botnet size Large [50] Small [50]
Bot bandwidth Usually small [50] Large [50]
C&C Centralized (IRC) Fully or partially distributed [35] [38] [65] [42]
Authentication Plain text MD5 [36], PKI [65]
C&C channel IRC protocol Various protocols, e.g. HTTP [127], Voip
[61], gmail [62], random ports [129]
Communication Plain text SSL [62], encryption, information hiding or
covert channel
Disguise IP No Yes, fake BGP route announcement [37]
Propagation Pure worm-like Propagate by command two-phase [38], su-
perbot [42]
Systems MS Windows Windows Linux, Mac, etc.
Others Kill Anti-Virus Kill Anti-Virus Honetypot aware [38], NAT
enabled [38], mimic human responding time
interval more intelligent DNSBL lookup
3.3 Botnet Framework & Lcbot
3.3.1 A Framework for Botnets/Worms
To make the analysis in the following sections more clear, we use the notion of rootbot
to denote the first host (bot) receiving and sending commands in the botnet. Obviously, the
rootbot has direct relationship to the botmaster and it is important to locate the rootbot to
traceback the botmaster. Similarly, the server is the host (bot) capable of initiating connections
for command delivery, and the client is the host (bot) only capable of receiving commands.
For a network composed of either a worm or a botnet, each infected host i is associated with
three parameters psi, pci, and ki, which are defined as follows:
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• psi ∈ {0, 1}: “Can the infected host i be a server in the botnet?”
• pci ∈ {0, 1}: “Can infected host i be a client in the botnet?”
• ki: the number of hosts with which an infected host i can communicate.
From the viewpoint of communication in command delivery, we can integrate various bot-
nets/worms into a framework by setting different values to these three parameters, as illus-
trated in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Framework for Botnet/Worm
psi pci ki
General worm 0 0 0
IRC bot 0 1 1, all bots wait in the same IRC channel
HTTP bot 1 0 1, all bots connect to the same HTTP
server
Torpig bot [96] 1 0 k. k: number of servers generated by do-
main flux
Randombot 1 1 [1−M ]. M : the size of the botnet
Superbot 0 or 1 1 If psi = 1, ki = [1−M ′]. M ′: the number
of the supernodes and clientnodes in each
group. If psi = 0, ki = 0
Hybriddbot 1 0 or 1 [1−M ]
From Table 3.3, we can easily differentiate worms or botnets of different kinds. To be
specific, since a worm needs not to be controlled, any worm host will neither be a server, nor
will it be a client. In other words, it is independent and maintains no information about others.
For a centralized bot, all the infected hosts need to connect with a common IRC server for
C&C. For any host, the parameter to be a client is 1, while there is no chance for any of them
to be a server, nor do they maintain a list of others except the IRC server.
For randombot, each infected host is a server, and meanwhile, it is a client of other bots
during command delivery. Therefore, both psi and pci are 1, and each host maintains a peerlist
of others for communication. For commands to be successfully relayed to all bots in the botnet
and robustness concerns, ki should not be too small (if ki = 1, the botnet is either a circle or
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partially connected). In addition, for any i 6= j, the larger distinction of the IPs in the peerlist
of i and j, the better.
In the case of superbot, certain number of hosts with psi = 1 choose to be a supernode,
the number of super nodes is determined by the botmaster. All the hosts are clients: they are
either the clients of a supernode, or the clients of multiple super nodes, indicating all pci = 1.
To ensure the network is well connected, ki needs to be large enough. For hybridbot, according
our definition, each host can grab commands from bots in its peerlist, resulting in all psi = 1.
On the other hand, the servant bot in [42] is also a client in our framework, it has pci = 1, and
all the other bots have pci = 0.
It is worth mentioning that, although the Torpig bot is discovered after the publishing
date of our paper, it is still a variation from our framework and hence can be captured by the
framework. This further validates the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
3.3.2 Metrics for A Good Botnet under the Proposed Framework
For any botnet/worm considered in the above framework, the key objective is to hide itself
as covert as possible; be robust against portion removal (random or select), be hard to be
traced back when part of it is detected, be efficient as much as possible in command delivery,
which are discussed in the following.
By covert, we mean there should be no obvious anomaly in communications among bots,
especially during C&C. Since the botmaster needs to issue the command to control the bots in
the botnet to launch attacks, if the attack is active attack (DDOS), once the communication
is detected, security professionals will have more time to take relative actions against it or
even stop it before it happens. If the attack is passive attack (keylogging), certain alert can
be announced beforehand to warn the public and prevent unnecessary loss. So in any sense,
the covert issue is one of the most important factors when designing the botnet.
As the anomaly can be in both content and behavior, we only consider the one in behavior.
Because it is relatively easy to use encryption or polymorphism to remove the anomaly in
content. Consequently, we use the C&C overhead ratio (or) to represent the level of covertness.
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It is defined by the number of messages actually generated when issuing a command divided
by the minimum number of messages needed to issue this command. Take an example of
randombot, since each bot maintains a list of k other bots, for a botnet of size M , there will
be kM command messages generated within a short time. However, the minimum number
of messages needed is M . If M is large, say 104, and k is chosen to be 22 (one version of
Nugachebot [129]), from the help of the network monitor system used in worm detection, it is
much easier to recognize the C&C behavior when 2.2 ∗ 105 duplicated command messages are
generated by 104 hosts than only 104 messages are generated. On the other hand, it is worth
mentioning that centralized botnet only needs M messages in C&C, indicating the ratio is 1.
By robust, we mean even after removing certain portion of bots, the command can still be
delivered to the majority of the remaining botnet. This removal can be either active or passive.
Active refers to the case where bots are removed by the security professional permanently, or
patched with the latest update. Passive refers to the case where bots are removed from the
botnet due to other factors like power shut down or network connection unavailable from the
victim side.
We use the mean coverage (mc) to represent the robustness of a botnet. The coverage
refers the maximum percentage of bots botmaster can reach after each removal (random or
select). Consequently, the mean coverage is the average value of coverage over all the removals.
It is important to use mean here, as this maximum percentage is not a fixed value and tends
to vary at each removal. If the mc is small, the botnet may be divided into multiple pieces,
each of which is independent. Similar metrics are also considered in other botnet studies [35].
By hard to be traced back, we mean once a bot is detected or honeypot is placed into the
botnet, it should be practically impossible to trace back the rootbot. This is because if there
is a high possibility to trace back the rootbot within a short time, similar to the centralized
case, it is possible to find the botmaster. In other words, the botmaster will prefer the botnet
with lower trace back probability on rootbot. We use the traceback probability (tp) for this
purposes. It is defined by the probability of detecting the rootbot in the botnet. Obviously,
the detection of rootbot can be either from the detection of rootbot itself or detection of the
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bots that the rootbot connects to. In addition, tp can be affected by many factors, such as the
number of IPs in the peer-list, the number of honeypots under our control.
By efficient, we mean under low tp rate, how fast the botmaster can relay the command to
all the bots in the botnet. This is also important for decentralized botnets, as a good bot army
should be responsible to any command. Therefore, we use the speedcdf in terms of hops to
represent the command spreading speed. On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind
the precondition of low tp. For example, the centralized bot is extremely fast in command
relay (one 1 hop is needed), but it also the easiest one to locate the centralized server.
Under the botnet framework, it is easy to correlate the parameters with one or more above
metrics. Generally, if the number of bots having psi = 1 is large, it indicates a large portion of
bots will be the server, the mc will be high or more robust. The or will be also high, or more
easily to be detected. On the other hand, there should be at least a portion of bots having
psi equal to 1 to make the botnet function properly. Further, if ki is too high, the command
speed is faster, which also results in higher value of tp (easy to trace back). However, if ki is
too low, mc will be low indicating the network may not be well connected.
3.3.3 Predicted Botnet (lcbot)
From above discussions, the values of psi and ki are important to current botnets. On one
hand, the botmaster wants the number of bots having psi = 1 and ki as low as possible to make
the C&C control more covert. On the other hand, given certain portion of bots in the botnet
will be turned off or cleaned at any time, these values have to be large enough to maintain the
connectivity within the remaining botnet.
Normally it is expected that attackers can adjust the above values to balance the tradeoff
in these proposed botnets under specific situations. However, in the real world, instead of
balancing the tradeoff between psi and ki, we believe attackers are smart enough to design more
intelligent botnets. In other words, they can achieve a good stealthiness level and high coverage.
The lcbot is one such example, and it is directly derived from the proposed framework.
The basic concept of lcbot is to consider the botnet being composed of many groups of
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different group codes, and decouple psi into pisi and posi. pisi is defined as the parameter of
being a server inside its own group, posi refers to being a server (or outlink bot) to bots outside
its own group. Any bot in the lcbot has pisi equal to 1, and the peerlist contains all the other
bots in the same group. Within each group, a small number of bots have posi equal to 1, and
each of these bots has only one peer in other groups to communicate with.
No current schemes differentiate these two parameters clearly, but it is possible to achieve
a good covertness level and high coverage through this decoupling. Fig. 3.2 illustrates different
possible patterns of the lcbot. Specifically, case 1 refers to the most compact mode, where each
bot in a group connects to one bot in other groups and can be connected by one bot in other
groups. Case 2 refers to the compact mode, where each of five bots (black, called outlink bot
in the following) is able to connect one bot in other group, and each of the other give bots
(gray) can receive the command from the bot in other groups. Case 3 refers to the redundant
mode, it is similar to the compact mode, but there is a certain number of bots (white) that
can not connect or being connected by the bot in other groups. In addition, all the bots within
a group can communicate with each other. There are many possible ways to construct such
botnet. Therefore, in this Chapter, we mainly focus on the final structure of lcbot and consider
a propagation scheme modified from [42] for its propagation.
One obvious advantage of this structure is that, like superbot or centralized botnets, only
a small number of messages are needed for C&C. On the other hand, it is robust as randombot
when there is bot removal (further evaluation results are provided in Chapter 3.4). In addition,
if we want to control the number of bots taking part in the attack, we can simply specify the
code of each group, all bots in a group will launch the attack if the code for this group is
included in the command. Encryption or unrelated data can be added to avoid the detection.
Further enhancements on command relaying can be added to it. That is, if a bot is an
outlink bot, it can send the command to the outpeer (say group B) with a time-to-live value
2. The bot receiving this new command in group B chooses a peer randomly in B, sends the
command to that bot, decreases the time-to-live value to 1. Consequently, the bot receiving this
new command with time-to-live value 1 broadcasts the command to all other group members
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Figure 3.2 Possible patterns of lcbot
in B. If the bot receives duplicate commands, the commands will be discarded. By doing so,
we can lower the chance of being detected in presence of honeypots. As honeypots can tell
who relays the command to them, there is a chance that a honeypot is in the peerlist of the
rootbot. The chance of being detected is much lower if the rootbot does not broadcast to all
its peers. Since the botnet is believed to be reused multiple times, and the botmaster can
choose any bot known to him as rootbot, the botmaster has to pay great attention not to be
detected due to reuse.
3.3.4 Propagation Method
The lcbot is open to any propagation scheme or can be established from any existing
centralized botnet. As an example, we consider a propagation scheme modified from [42] for
lcbot propagation, which is illustrated in Fig. 3.3.
To summarize, step 0 and 1 decide the necessary parameters for establishing the botnet.
The code pool and the values of Mbot, Ngroup and Nog are all chosen by the botmaster. Step 2
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Step 0: Preinfection
Botmaster determines the number (Mbot) of bots he wants to infect, the number of groups
(Ngroup, each group is associated with a group code), and number Nog of outlink bots.
Then start with an infector (we name it botA,1) with the current group code, say A.
Step 1: Infection new hosts
On infecting a new victim (e.g. botA,2), the bot (botA,1) updates its inpeerlist (peerlist
within group) with botA,2, and divide the number of remaining bots (Mbot/Ngroup− 2, in
this example) to form group A by 2. Then, botA,1 sends the group code, the inpeerlist,
the number of new bots needed to the new bot (botA,2 in this case). Repeat step 1 till
no more bots are needed to form the group. In addition, schemes to detect the VMwares
or Honeypots can be used before the success of infection.
Step 2: Establish group
All the bots in group (e.g. group A) communicate with peers in its inpeerlist to update
within-group peerlist information. And choose to be the outlink bot with probability of
Nog ∗Ngroup/Mbot. If no more group is needed to infect, go to step 4.
Step 3: Establish consequent groups
The infectors in the remaining Ngroup−1 groups are further infected by the bots in group
A (each bot in A infects upto (Ngroup−1)∗Ngroup/Mbot infectors. Each infector in other
groups repeats step 1 and 2.
Step 4: Establish lcbot
All the outlink bots keep scanning. When finding a bot having a different group code,
the outlink bot replace its outpeerlist (peers outside its group) with probability of 50%.
The scanning stops after enough time or enough number of bots visited by the outlink
bot. Other bots can also be used to in this step to find the bots in other groups [42].
Step 5: Be dynamic
Each outlink bot i will decide to pass his outpeer information to its group peer by a
probability function P (t), which is related to the time t. Once P (t) is larger than a
threshold e.g. 0.5, a new bot is randomly chosen in the same group and the outpeer is
sent to the new bot. The previous bot deletes the outpeer information and is no longer
an outlink bots.
Figure 3.3 Algorithm Description
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and 3 describe how a group is established. Different combination of worms can be used in these
steps. Step 4 shows how to build each group into a botnet. Step 5 enables a bot to change
the role of whether to discard the outpeer with a probability depending on time. Algorithms
similar to domain flux can also be used in Step 5. Once the probability is over a threshold, it
will pass the outlink information to another peer in the same group. By dynamically changing
the outlink bot, the importance of the specific outlink bot is further decreased, making it more
robust against removal.
3.4 Evaluations
To analyze and compare the performance of the proposed botnet with others in the liter-
ature, we consider the botnet of size 1000 (consists of 1000 online bots), as we believe it is
the common size of the current botnet. The botnets chosen for comparison are randombot
[38] and superbot [42]. Matlab is used to obtain the simulation results. For each metric under
consideration, we simulate 1000 times and average the results. All bots considered in this
Chapter are homogeneous. For superbot, we consider the group size to be 25, which is same
as the group size of lcbot. All bots in randombots, or supernodes in superbot, have peerlist
of size five to communicate with other randombots or supernodes respectively. Accordingly,
each group of the lcbot has five outlink bots each of which can communicate with one peer in
another group.
3.4.1 Evaluation of the Propagation Scheme
A good propagation scheme should spread the bots evenly in the peerlists. In other words,
the distribution of parents (number of bots sending command to a bot) shared by each bot
should be balanced. This is because the unbalanced parent distribution can leak additional
information on the botnet. For example, even if the peerlist size is the same for all bots in the
botnet, if the bot is not selected by the peers in a uniform way during propagation, once the
bots having larger number of parents are captured, it is quite similar to centralized botnets.
As it is easy to find a large portion of other bots in the botnet, which leads to the possibility
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to stop the whole botnet. Ideally, we want the parents to be evenly distributed in each bot
after propagation.
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Figure 3.5 Variation of # of parents
Fig. 3.4 and 3.5 illustrate the distribution of parents when the propagation scheme is
applied. We can find that, most bots in the botnet are the parents of other 24-26 bots. And
the variation is pretty small, this also confirms the correctness of the propagation scheme in
[38].
3.4.2 Performance Comparison of P2P Botnets
3.4.2.1 Mean Coverage
To obtain the mc values for different bots, we consider both random and select removals.
The removal happens either when the bot host is turned off or lost network connection. There-
fore, the random removal is considered to happen randomly; indicating any bot in the cor-
responding botnet has the same probability to be removed. On the other hand, the select
removal refers to the removal of important bots (e.g. supernode in superbot).
Fig. 3.6 and 3.7 show the mean coverage of randombot, superbot, and the proposed botnet
when random removal is present. In Fig. 3.6(3.7), the peerlist size is 4(5) for randombot,
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Figure 3.6 MC after random removal
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Figure 3.7 MC after random removal
the peerlist size among supernodes is 4(5) for superbot, and the number of outlink bots for
a group is 4(5) in lcbot. As we can find, in presence of small removal, the proposed botnet
achieves highest mean coverage. However, when the percentage is larger than 0.2, there is a
sharp decrease in mean coverage for our scheme. This can be explained as follows, when the
removal increases to certain value, the nodes that outlink bots connect to might be removed.
Therefore, even these outlink bots are still active, the mean coverage is as bad as in superbot
in the worst case. One direct enhancement is then to enable the outlink bot to have more than
one peers, and choose one at a time.
Fig. 3.8 shows the case where select removal happens. The important nodes are the
supernode or the outlink bot in lcbot. As we can find, since the important node in lcbot is
less important than the supernode in superbot, it achieves a high coverage when the number
of select removal is same.
3.4.2.2 Overhead Ratio
Another important metric for P2P botnet is the level of covertness during C&C, since the
more number of the same or similar commands; the more likely the C&C can be detected. Fig.
3.9 shows the overhead ratio of each botnet via simulations. We can find that the overhead
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Figure 3.9 Overhead ratio
ratio of randombot increases quickly with the increase of peerlist size. On the other hand, the
overhead ratio values for the other two schemes keep low and nearly unchanged under different
peerlist size. This tells us the randombot is more likely to be detected during C&C. In terms
of this metric, superbot and lcbot achieve similar performances.
3.4.2.3 Traceback Possibility
Further, we consider the possibility of being traced back. If the bot in the first and second
hop of C&C happen to be the honeypots, it is possible to locate the rootbot. It is analogue to
the case in the centralized botnet where IRC server is located. And usually there will be more
than one honeypot in the botnet. Consequently, the traceback probability is given by:
tp = 1− (1− p)n∗N
where p refers to the probability that at least one honeypot happens to be within the first
two hops in C&C, n is the percentage of the honeypot in the botnet, and N is the to-
tal number of bots in the botnet, which is 1000 in this evaluation. In our case, given the
size of the botnet, the size of the peerlist in each bot and the C&C methods discussed
in lcbot, we can find the p for randombot and lcbot is 0.006 and 0.002 respectively. For
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superbot, we consider two cases: case 1 refers to the situation where the botmaster only
knows the super nodes, case 2 refers to the general case where any bot is known to the
botmaster. In case 1, as each supernode can communicate with 24 nodes in the group and
5 other super nodes, p is equal to 0.03. In case 2, since each node can be chosen randomly,
p = average#ofhoneypotsinthefirst2hopsbotnetsize =
1+(psupernodeNsupernode+pclientnodeNclientnode)
N . Where psupernode
and pclientnode refer to the pobability of being supernode and clientnode respectively, and
psupernode = 1− pclientnode.
We can find from Fig. 3.10 that, given the same traceback probability, lcbot requires more
honeypots to be placed in the botnets than others. This shows that the lcbot is less likely to be
traced back when compared with other P2P botnets. As we can find, the superbot case1 has
the lowest performance, because the number of super nodes is small and it is very easy to locate
the supernode. On the other hand, the superbot case2 outperforms the randombot, indicating
in the general case, randombot has the worst performance in traceback probability for the
botnet parameters used in our evaluation. It is also worth mentioning that, if randombot
switches to the C&C method discussed in lcbot, the traceback probability will be the same
with lcbot. Accordingly, the speed of C&C in randombot will also be the same with lcbot,
which is shown in the next section.
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3.4.2.4 C&C Hops
Fig. 3.11 shows on average how many hops are needed for a command to be delivered to
the whole botnet. The proposed botnet has the lowest speed in terms of hops. However, when
regarding to time cost, since the end-to-end delay of each hop may be in the amount of seconds,
15 hops in delay may only cause several seconds or minutes, which is tolerable. On the other
hand, the fewer the hops, the more likely that the rootbot can be detected. For example, the
centralized bot only have 1 hop to all the bots which makes the server (HTTP or IRC) easy
to detect. So we believe the hops required by lcbot are still acceptable.
To summarize, with regard to the above metrics, the lcbot demonstrate better performances
when compared with other two, and it is pretty likely that this kind of botnet will appear in
the near future.
3.4.2.5 Potential Ways of Detection
In general, to detect the membership of botnet, we believe it is important to understand the
life cycle of botnet such that proper schemes can be designed for specific phases. In addition to
[127], we classify another five phases for botnet which is useful in detection. The five phases are
propagation phase, C&C phase, silent phase, updating phase, and attack phase. Propagation
phase refers to the time that a botnet spreads to form a new botnet; C&C phase refers to
the period of command delivery; silent phase is the time botnet waits for commands from the
botmaster; updating phase refers to the time botnet is updating itself to more advanced one;
and attack phase refers to the specific actions (DDOS, etc.) required by the botmaster in the
C&C phase.
Among these five phases, updating is also an action after C&C, but it causes no damage
to the Internet, so we classify it as an independent phase. Consequently, of these five phases,
it is nearly impossible to detect botnet in silent phase, because all bots behave like normal
hosts. In the attack phase where attack is launched, it is usually too late for detection. In
contrast, mitigation is more important in this phase. Therefore, proper detection schemes can
be designed on the other three phases, which are propagation phase, updating phase and C&C
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phase.
We will discuss the detection on C&C in the next chapter. In this section, we only consider
the propagation phase. From the view point of infection during propagation, there is always
a vulnerability used for infection. Unlike other detection schemes proposed in the literature
which is based on anomaly of botnet from the normal traffic, possible detection can be designed
in a reversed way: there should be something botnet can not have, while it always exists in
the normal traffic.
Take an example of buffer overflow, which is a commonly used vulnerability in various
infections (bot/worm), the contents bot/worm can not have but normal traffic can have are:
\x00, \x0A\0x0D, \0x5C (optional) and \0x90 (optional, if too many \0x90, there may exist
shellcode). This is because usually shellcode is used in buffer overflow. To have the shellcode
work, \x00 is not permitted, since it indicates the end of buffer, resulting in all the following
codes unable to be executed. On the other hand, normal traffic does not have such kind of
limitation as they never need to run this way. \x0A\0x0D are \r\n which are frequently used
in the protocol headers (like HTTP) for information exchange. But \r\n means enter when
used in shellcode, leading to the uselessness of the codes afterwards. \0x5C is not allowed for
certain bot/worm, like Agobot. To better illustrate what we discuss above, we attach a piece
of Agobot code in Fig. 3.12.
As we can find in the above code, as long as there is any of \x00, \x0A; \0x0D, and \0x5C,
the shellcode is XORed with the xorkey, which is \0x98 in the code. On the other hand, since
the buffer overflow usually happens when victim machine is handling the malicious request,
the request is always associated with certain protocol headers (like RPC, HTTP). Therefore,
there should be enough \x00, \x0A\0x0D, \0x5C among the normal requests. In addition, to
enable network communication, network related function like socket; bind should be used in
the shellcode, leading to the length of shellcode larger than the corresponding normal request
in certain protocol (e.g. GET in HTTP).
Based on the above discussion, a threshold based scheme to detect bot/worm can be used.
For example, we count the number of \x00, \x0A\0x0D, \0x5C and calculate the ratio of this
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Figure 3.12 Code from Agobot
number to the entire length of the request. If the ratio is less than a certain value, shellcode
should exist in the request. Of course, different protocols may have different threshold values.
Further implementation and evaluation of this scheme is considered as one of our future work.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we first propose a framework integrating the botnet/worm for a thorough
understanding on the inherent relationships between botnets and worms. We then predict
a new botnet capable of achieving a better overall performance in terms of the metrics we
concerned so far and the observation is further supported by the simulations. In addition,
although it is hard to detect the existence of P2P botnets, we discuss potential mechanism
that can be used for botnet detection. Consequently, in the next Chapter, we further extend
this research to detect the C&C commands in advanced P2P botnets by making use of the
node behavior profiling approach proposed in Chapter 2.
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CHAPTER 4. Node Behavior based C&C Channel Detection for P2P
Botnets
Due to the distributed nature and controllable characteristic, botnets are believed to be
the platform for most current attacks towards the Internet. We have studied the relationships
between different botnet structures and compared their performances under different metrics
in Chapter 3. In this Chapter, we consider the problem of botnet detection. It is one of
the most important problems in botnet research, as many techniques such as mitigation and
traceback are directly based on the detection of botnets. In the literature, most recent studies
on botnet detection primarily rely on two assumptions: prior knowledge of potential C&C
channels (e.g. IRC channel) and capability of monitoring them. However, when botnets
switch to a P2P structure and utilize multiple protocols for C&C, the above assumptions no
longer hold. Consequently, the detection of P2P botnets is more difficult. Little work has been
done in this direction in the current literature.
In this chapter, we relax the above assumptions and focus on C&C channel detection
for P2P botnets. We first use the proposed node behavior profiling approach to capture
the node behaviors in a network; then propose two anomaly detection schemes using formal
statistical tests on popular behaviors in this network. In brief, the key difference between
our work and previous work in botnet detection is that, instead of trying to filter out the
botnet behaviors in a network, we detect them by measuring their impacts on one or more
normal behaviors in a statistical way. Moreover, we make use of SPRT to measure the impacts
of the C&C behavior from P2P botnets (H1) on normal behaviors (H0) in a fast manner.
This is achieved by simplifying the node behavior profiling approach suitable for SPRT for fast
detection. Furthermore, by considering the worst case attack model where the botmaster knows
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all the parameter values used in SPRT detection, we formulate the SPRT-based C&C detection
problem as an optimization problem and derive the optimal values of H1 mathematically.
An SPRT-based fast and optimized detection approach is further proposed. We validate the
assumptions made in this Chapter under different real user traces from enterprise network
environments. To evaluate the performances of the proposed approaches, we consider both
simple and realistic cases and achieve encouraging results in terms of high detection and low
false positive rates. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider the worst case
attack model and propose corresponding solution that derives the optimal value of H1 for
SPRT in botnet related research.
4.1 Introduction
“A botnet is comparable to compulsory military service for windows boxes” - Stromberg
[33]. According to [34], a typical botnet is a network geographically distributed, consisting of
40 to 400,000 computer systems with average of about 2,000 to 10,000 machines. The largest
documented botnet yet is believed to be comprised of 1.5 million compromised PCs [36].
The botnet has also spread widely across different carriers and platforms in recent years.
According to the Cyber Threats Report 2009 from www.gtiscsecuritysummit.com, about 15
percent of all online computers are infected with bots. It is even possible to see the botnet
problem infiltrate the mobile world in 2009 [116]. Moreover, in addition to Windows systems,
security researchers have also discovered that payloads delivered by Trojans in pirated versions
of iWork and Photoshop earlier 2009 are being used to create a Mac botnet [117]. On the other
hand, the new trend of botnets is characterized by smaller botnet size, more advanced C&C
(P2P structure) [38], higher capacity/ability of each bot [52], and stronger self-resilience [38].
Most current research on botnets focuses on C&C detection for centralized botnets, usually
under two inherent assumptions: prior knowledge of potential C&C channels (e.g. IRC or
HTTP) and capability of monitoring them. However, when botnets switch to more advanced
ones, those assumptions no longer hold, e.g. no knowledge about the potential C&C channel,
thereby no place to monitor, making the current detection schemes unable to detect the more
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advanced botnets.
By more advanced botnets in this Chapter, we refer to the ones not only with a P2P (peer-
to-peer) structure, but also capable of using different ports for C&C. Utilizing multiple ports
in C&C for P2P botnets is easy to implement and possibly widely used in current botnets. For
example, as noted in [129], once the Nugache bot was altered to use random high-numbered
service ports for each bot, the malware dropped off nearly everyone’s radar.
Therefore, to make effective countermeasures against botnets, it is very important to design
detection schemes for P2P botnets (for concise representations, the term P2P botnets and
more advanced botnets are exchangeable in the following of this Chapter, unless otherwise
specified). Consequently, in this Chapter, our focus is to design detection schemes without
previous assumptions used in the current centralized botnet detection schemes and make use
of node behavior profiling with statistical testing.
Since the two assumptions used for centralized botnet detection no longer hold in P2P
case, to detect the P2P based botnets, protocol and structure independent schemes have to
be considered [27]. Usually, the design of such schemes requires continuously processing the
normal traffic before detection. For example, Botminer [27] uses three filters to remove normal
traffic at the first stage. However, as the C&C traffic is usually of short lifetime and intermittent
in the network, there is a large amount of time that the network traffic does not include any
C&C traffic. Consequently, processing such network traffic causes unnecessary computation
overhead and slows down the response time. Hence, the design of fast detection schemes is
also very important but little work has been done in the literature.
4.1.1 Overview of the Proposed Approach
In general, from the studies of P2P botnets in [65] [38] [68] [42], the advantages (e.g.
robustness) of P2P botnets are mainly from the structure rather than the specific P2P protocol.
Consequently, many P2P botnets [65] [38] [68] [42] proposed in the literature can randomly
choose from either P2P protocols and/or non-P2P protocols for C&C. In addition, utilizing
multiple non-P2P ports in C&C for P2P botnets is acknowledged in the literature and possibly
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Figure 4.1 Examples of node behavior based detection
widely used in current botnets, such as the variation of Nugachebot [129], which uses random
high-numbered service ports for each bot. Therefore, in this Chapter, given the trace data
we have, we only consider the latter one and regard the detection of P2P botnets using P2P
protocols as our further work.
Given the unique characteristics (small volume, short lifetime from a group of bots and
mixed with normal traffic) of C&C behavior, and the correlation of node behavior profiles, we
are able to design anomaly detection schemes based on formal statistical tests to determine if
there are notable underlying botnet C&C behaviors in the network. The proposed approaches
are primarily based on node behavior profiles proposed in Chapter 2, which characterizes the
node behavior by jointly considering spatial and temporal correlations. As illustrated in Fig.
4.1, the main idea of our approaches is to find node behavior characteristics that are statistically
stable in the training data, and detect the abnormal behaviors by measuring the statistical
changes on the existing profiles, especially popular ones.
Further, we propose an approach to fast detect C&C channel of P2P botnets by using
SPRT (Sequential Probability Ratio Test) in an optimal way on the node behavior profiles
in Chapter 2. To be specific, by simplifying each node behavior into a Bernoulli variable, we
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make use of SPRT for fast detection. As we do not have full knowledge of H1, we consider the
worst case attack model, formulate the C&C channel detection as an optimization problem
and derive the optimal values for SPRT mathematically. An SPRT based fast and optimized
detection scheme (SPRT-FOD) is further proposed to make use of the optimal values.
In the evaluation part, similar to [27] [97], since the enterprise network is less studied than
the Internet [10], we consider the enterprise network from [10] in this Chapter. Moreover, in
addition to simply combining two independent traffic types (bot traffic and normal traffic)
during the evaluation (simple case), we consider the case where the bot traffic is correlated
with the normal traffic (realistic case). That is, to avoid being detected, the botmaster can
obtain important information (e.g. services ports and destination range) about the network
where his bots locate, randomly assign the C&C ports and peers within the same range of
this network to each bot. This correlation is usually not considered in the current research,
but we believe this case is more realistic and could be adopted by the botmaster easily (e.g.
slight change of Nugachebot in [129]). In particular, we make the following contributions in
this Chapter:
1. Capture the normal traffic using node behavior profiles, formulate the problem of de-
tecting C&C traffic as detecting additional behaviors over the existing normal behavior
profiles.
2. Propose two anomaly detection schemes using statistical tests on popular behavior pro-
files, under the assumption that certain metrics of popular behaviors will be statistically
stable.
3. Propose a fast anomaly detection scheme using SPRT, derive the optimal parameter
values for the worst case attack model by formulating the C&C detection problem as
an optimization problem. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider the
worst case attack model and propose corresponding solution that derives the optimal
value of H1 for SPRT in botnet related research.
4. Validate the assumptions made in this Chapter using real traces from enterprise networks.
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5. Evaluate the detection schemes in both simple and realistic scenarios.
The following of this chapter is organized as follows: Chapter 4.2 describes the background
and related work in the literature on P2P botnets and botnet detection. We introduce the
correlation based node behavior profiling approach in brief and propose two detection schemes
using statistical tests in Chapter 4.3. The fast and optimized detection is further proposed
in Chapter 4.4. In Chapter 4.5, we first validate the assumptions made for detection, and
evaluate our schemes by using P2P botnet C&C traffic with the real trace from enterprise
network environments, detecting known and advanced P2P botnets (simple and realistic case)
is further considered. We discuss the limitations and our future work in Chapter 4.5 and
conclude in Chapter 4.6.
4.2 Background & Related Work
4.2.1 Introduction to SPRT
The SPRT has been shown [130] to be optimal under H0 and H1 in the sense of minimizing
the average sample size among all the tests (sequential or nonsequential) under the same false
positive and false negative rates. The minimum average sample size in SPRT thereby provides
means of fast detection when SPRT is used in anomaly NIDS. In the literature, the basic idea
of SPRT is to calculate the likelihood ratio on a given sequence of samples (observed as X1,
..., Xn) to determine whether these samples are from H0 or H1. Assume the samples Xi are
i.i.d. (independent and identically-distributed), we have:
Sn = ln
∏
i Pr(Xi|H1)∏
i Pr(Xi|H0)
=
∑
i
ln
Pr(Xi|H1)
Pr(Xi|H0)
According to [132], [131], to calculate this likelihood Si, on each observed sample Xi, Si is
used in a way such that it (S1 = 0 for i = 1) increases with length ln(p1/p0) when Xi = 1,
and decreases with length ln(1− p1)/(1− p0) when Xi = 0. With user chosen α and β (false
positive rate and false negative rate), if Si goes down to reach the lower bound A = lnβ/(1−α),
we reach the conclusion that there is no evidence to reject the non-hypothesis (H0) and the
current network is normal. If Si hits the upper bound B = ln(1 − β)/α, there is evidence to
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reject the non-hypothesis, so we generate an alert. For the case where A < Si < B, it indicates
that more sample data are needed before making the decision. In most practical applications,
when SPRT finishes, the actual false positive and false negative rate (αˆ and βˆ) are usually
close to α and β [133].
Consequently, the expected the number of sample needed before decision can be derived as
following [131]:
E[n0] =
(1− α) ln β1−α + α ln 1−βα
p0 ln
p1
p0
+ (1− p0) ln 1−p11−p0
(4.1)
E[n1] =
β ln β1−α + (1− β) ln 1−βα
p1 ln
p1
p0
+ (1− p1) ln 1−p11−p0
(4.2)
However, despite the advantages, one of the most important issues with SPRT is the de-
termination of p1, which requires full knowledge of H1. If p1 is not determined carefully,
the resulting average sample size can be considerably larger than the sample size needed by
fixed-sample-size tests [134].
4.2.2 Related Work
4.2.2.1 P2P Botnet
The structure of P2P botnets has been widely discussed in the literature. In [31], the au-
thors list the timeline of captured P2P botnets. The authors in [35] did a thorough study on
botnet structures and show that random botnets are highly resistant to different removal meth-
ods. Several different P2P botnets have also been proposed such as hybridbot [65], randombot
[38], lcbot [68] and superbot [42].
To be specific, as illustrated in Fig. 4.2 (each bot has a peerlist of 5), each bot in ran-
dombot/hybridbot maintains a peerlist for communication during C&C; superbot divides the
botnet into multiple groups, with each group having a supernode (middle node in Fig. 4.2), the
C&C among supernodes is like randombot, while the C&C within each group is like centralized
botnets; lcbot is a mixture of superbot and randombot, each bot has a peerlist with one peer
outside its group and others within its group, it has a better performance in terms of mean
coverage after certain removals and low overhead during C&C as shown in [68].
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PUSH or PULL based communications [27] can be further used for each kind of P2P
botnet. It is also worth pointing out that, in all these P2P botnets, there is no limitation to
use any specific protocols for C&C, thus different protocols can be used for C&C, (e.g. there
are reports of botnets using gmail and skype for C&C). In practice, it is easy to implement
multiple protocols for C&C in P2P botnets, and it is very likely to happen widely nowadays
(e.g. Nugache bot using random ports for each bot during C&C [129]).
Figure 4.2 P2P botnet structures
4.2.2.2 Botnet Detection
In the literature, many detection schemes have been applied with a focus on gaining full
understanding of botnets and their threat. Specially, the authors in [50] conducted several basic
studies of botnet dynamics and the authors in [107] analyze the bot source code to provide
an inside look at the botnets. In [36], a DNS sinkholing technique is proposed and the global
diurnal behavior of botnets is studied. Further, in [96], after analyzing the detailed bot code
of Torpig, the authors bought two domain names found in the server list of individual Torpig
bot and take the botnet under control for weeks to observe the bot behaviors in sensitive
information gathering.
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Many detection schemes have also been proposed in the literature to detect botnets with a
centralized structure. To summarize, those schemes are based on one or more of the following
techniques: honeypot/honeynet [33], DNS inspection [38] [127] [49], DNSBL inspection [52],
traffic pattern recognition/clustering [47], temporal or spatial correlation [27] [28] [29], and
many others [54] [55] [56] [57] [63] [64].
Among all the techniques proposed in the literature, honeypot/honeynet should be the
most successful approach to detecting and analyzing a botnet. The basic idea of honetpot is
to emulate an exploited computer to be infected by a bot. Therefore, a computer solely used
for this purpose is called honeypot and multiple honeypots can be setup to form a honeynet.
The honeypot is generally isolated from the network in the sense that only incoming traffic
is allowed, preventing any further infection by the honeypot. Virtual machines can be used
together with honeypots to emulate the virtual network environment. Several variations of
honeypot are also proposed in [46] [47].
However, despite the wide use and successful application of honeypots, honeypot has several
limitations.
1. As pointed out by [97]: honeypots of low-interaction can capture attacks from a limited
number of known exploits that they emulate; and honeypots of high-interaction can
neither scale well nor implementing all services.
2. Although it is easy for honeypots to capture malwares exploiting vulnerabilities on remote
machines, it is hard for them to capture malwares using emails or web-download, and
there is no guarantee on the volume of malwares honeypots can capture because they are
used in passive mode.
3. Malwares can detect honeypots or virtual machine environment commonly used for hon-
eypots [38, 108, 109] to evade capture. For example, the authors in [38] proposed a
honeypot aware approach to detect and remove the honeypot by using some bots as
sensors, under the assumption that the security professionals deploying honeypots have
liability constraints such that they cannot allow their honeypots to participate in real
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(or too many real) attacks [38].
Therefore, due to the above weaknesses, honeypot alone is not sufficient enough to detect
botnet of different variations. More research is needed. Consequently, the authors in [52]
propose DNSBL lookup counting. Unlike the honeypot approach and the protocol dependent
ones, DNSBL lookup counting is based on the observation of there are some basic requirements
for a botnet to function properly.
To be specific, for the botnet sending spams, each bot needs to know if the spam it sends
will be successfully delivered to the receiver. Since the mail server on the receiver end may
check the DNSBL and any email from the machine on the DNSBL will be blocked. The botnet
needs to check the DNSBL before sending spam. Based on the observation that the ratio of
the querying requests sent from a host to the query requests on that host will be of different
values for a botnet and for a normal user, the author in [52] designed a counting scheme on
detecting bot. Although it is also easy to be overcome by the bot, (e.g. bot can use proxy for
DNSBL query, or generate fake queries) it provides good insight on the detection of the bot.
However, it is only focused on finding botnet members generating spams. As pointed out in
[97], their approach may be useful in some cases, but not generally valid and can cause many
false positives.
In [55], the authors propose Rishi to detect IRC botnets by matching known nickname
patterns of IRC bots. Since it is based on signature of bot nicknames in IRC, it is accurate
only if a comprehensive signature set is available. However, it is trivial for botmaster to change
the nicknames for bots in the botnet to avoid detection. The authors in [111] [111] [56] extract
features under specific IRC protocol such as bytes per second and apply machine learning
based approaches for botnet detection. However, their approaches are dependent on specific
protocol and will be ineffective when other protocol is used in C&C.
There are also some recent advances in botnet detection. To be specific, in [24], by ag-
gregating traffic of similar payload, same external destination, and internal hosts with similar
OS platforms, the authors proposed a system called TAMD to detect malware including bot-
nets. The authors in [27] [28] [29] proposed three kinds of detection approaches: BotHunter,
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BotMiner and BotSniffer. BotHunter detects the bots by associating IDS events to a user-
defined bot infection dialog model, and it is a passive detection system. BotSniffer is designed
to detect centralized botnets by using horizontal correlation. The authors in [28] used SPRT
on the character distribution (2-gram) to detect C&C channels of centralized botnets, under
the assumption that within certain time interval (e.g. 10 min), the bot commands have high
similarity in pattern while normal IRC private messages are not.
However, the BotSniffer works only for centralized IRC botnets and the authors do not
consider the worst case performance of their scheme. As it is usually possible that botmaster
knows all the parameters used for SPRT, it is very easy for the botmaster to evade detec-
tion. In this Chapter, on the other hand, as the character distribution can be easily removed
by encryption or compression, we focus on node behaviors instead of character distribution.
Moreover, we consider the detection of P2P botnets without any assumptions used in central-
ized botnet detection (used in Botsniffer). Furthermore, we consider the worst case (botmaster
knows all the parameters in SPRT) in detecting P2P botnets to find the optimal values for
SPRT test.
BotMiner [27] also utilizes a horizontal correlation approach that examines correlation
across multiple hosts [27] and is also designed for P2P botnet detection. It did a good job of
detecting the C&C channel of P2P botnets under the assumption of frequent communication
between peers and capability of detecting attacks launched by bots after C&C.
However, as four histograms in C&C communications are needed during detection, it mainly
focuses on detecting P2P botnets requiring frequent communication between peers (e.g. PULL
based). As botnets do not require frequent communications among peers in general (except the
bot located in the network using NAT), it is uncertain that their scheme can detect general P2P
botnets (e.g. the sample needed for histogram may not be large enough for general botnets).
Moreover, detection of attacks generated by bots is a necessary condition in [27] to detect
the C&C channel. Given many attacks used by botnets (e.g. clickfraud) are much harder to
detect, it is uncertain that their scheme can detect C&C channel of P2P botnets launching
more sophisticated attacks.
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To summarize, most schemes rely on the two assumptions for detection or are based on
the detection of worms or other attacks. Unfortunately, they become ineffective when botnets
shift to other structures, other propagation methods, use encryption in C&C or launch more
sophisticated attacks (e.g. clickfraud). Therefore, more work on detecting C&C of P2P botnets
needs to be done. In this Chapter, our work aims to detect C&C channel without the above
constraints, and only rely on the statistical nature of the node behavior profiles and formal
statistical tests including SPRT.
4.3 P2P Botnet Detection using Statistical Tests and Correlation based
Node Behavior Profiling
In this section, we describe our detection algorithms, which perform statistical tests on
the node behaviors. We first briefly introduce the attributes used for profiling. Clustering is
then used to find the representative behavior profiles. Classical statistical tests and SPRT are
further discussed to construct the detection algorithms.
4.3.1 Attribute Selection & Behavior Clustering
We have discussed the node behavior profiling approach in Chapter 2. In this section,
we introduce the main idea in brief. According to [66], the attributes are chosen from the
observation of the action sequence of normal users. The action sequence differs greatly between
the normal user and the botnet. Since the botnet is dynamic: peers in the botnet can be
dynamically shut down or removed from the botnet at any time, a bot may send commands
to both online and oﬄine peers on certain ports from its peer list. On the other hand, it is
very unlikely that a normal user (or a majority of normal users) generates the normal behavior
this way. Therefore, as discussed in Chapter 2, this difference provides inherent guidelines in
selecting and simplifying the attributes for node profiling.
Consequently, for attributes with large dimensions, e.g. the dimension of destinations may
be quite large, we need to simplify the attributes in a way more favorable for normal behaviors
while unfavorable for C&C. Firstly, we categorize the destinations as least, less, moderate
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and most popular categories, and only consider the corresponding packets generated in each
category (represented as pktd,i,t). Secondly, we consider all the services as attributes for node
profiling, as the combination of all the normal services should also be considered normal. In
addition, we only consider TCP traffic, as most of C&C traffic uses TCP (it is similar to design
behavior profiles under UDP). Within each application, we consider the packets sent for that
application. This is because the node behavior can be better characterized by the packets sent
rather than the bytes sent, as bytes only represent the accumulated level of packets. Instead,
we consider the total amount of traffic (in bytes) generated and received using tgi and tri for
node i. Thus the node behavior xi,t for node i at time t is xi,t = {(pkti,j,t, tgi,t, tri,t, pktd,i,t)|1 ≤
i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤M, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ d ≤ 4} (the above parameters are listed in Table 2.1).
As there is no prior knowledge on how many common behavior clusters are shared by
different nodes in the network, agglomerative clustering is used to find possible clusters. Similar
to [66], after identifying the active nodes that initiate connections and removing the silent
nodes, the classic agglomerative clustering algorithm is further used [66]. It treats each xi,t as
a cluster at the beginning, then calculated the pairwise distance for any two points (or xi,ts),
and combined two points or clusters into one cluster if the distance between them is below
a threshold Th. The criterion to compare the distance on combining clusters is the largest
distance, and we set Th = 0.25 in the evaluation section. The distance is measured by the
extended Jaccard distance which is defined as [11]: d(x1, x2) = 1− x
′
1
x2
||x1||2+||x2||2−x′1x2
.
4.3.2 Design of Node Behavior based Detection Algorithms
Of all the behaviors (or clusters) identified in the training data, we are interested in those
which are most common (or popular). This is because we can get enough samples from those
popular behaviors, and have more accurate estimations on the metrics of interest. Therefore,
in terms of detection, if there is any group behavior in the new sample data which is unseen
in the training data, as shown in Fig. 4.3, most of time, it will either cause the change of
proportion of popular behaviors (as illustrated in case 1, the original behavior i may switch
to another behavior j, affected by the unseen behavior in the new data); or the change of
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intra-cluster distances within each popular behavior (as illustrated in case 2, if the affected
behavior still belongs to cluster i).
Generally, both above cases will happen simultaneously in one or more behavior clusters,
so we can design algorithms based on different statistical tests for each case. Consequently, the
assumption made in our detection approaches is that the metrics for popular behaviors should
be statistically stable across training data and new data (we validate this assumption in next
section).
Figure 4.3 Node behavior change with/without C&C traffic
4.3.2.1 Behavior Proportion based Test (BPT)
For the l popular behavior clusters identified (in general, we consider the first l popular
behaviors, e.g. l = 3), consider the ith popular behavior (i ∈ l) a specified property in the new
data, statistical test on population proportion of specified property can be applied in testing
if the proportion of the ith behavior in the new sample is from the same population as the
training data.
To be specific, given the training data sufficiently large, the estimate of proportion of the
popular behavior i can be considered as an accurate estimate for the corresponding population.
For any new sample captured, if it is from the same population as the training data, under a
predetermined significance level α, the test will give no evidence of rejecting the non-hypothesis.
On the other hand, if they are from different populations, the test will reject the non-hypothesis.
76
In detail, the new sample size n and the number of occurrences of popular behavior i
(denoted by Numi, Numi is then a random variable) may vary from time to time. At time
interval t, two possible cases have to be considered, one is called the large sample case, with
both npi,0 ≥ 10 and n(1−pi,0) ≥ 10, where pi,0 is the true value of the proportion that popular
behavior i in the population. The other is called the small sample case, where either npi,0 < 10
or n(1−pi,0) < 10, or both. Two kinds of tests are needed for these two cases. From [26], for the
large sample test, both Numi and the estimator pˆi,new = Numi/n are approximately normally
distributed. Therefore, for the null hypothesis H0 : pˆi,new = pi,0 (with Ha : pi,new 6= pi,0), the
test statistic
z =
pˆi,new − pi,0√
pi,0(1− pi,0)/n
(4.3)
The above null hypothesis will be rejected if z ≥ zα/2 or z ≤ −zα/2, otherwise, there is no
evidence to reject the null hypothesis at significance level α.
For the small sample case [26], the small-sample test can be used, and it is based on
binomial distribution. Usually in this test, a rejection region or acceptance region is used at
given significance level α. We use the acceptance region in this Chapter, it is given by [a, b],
where
α/2 ≤ Bino(a;n, pi,0) (4.4)
Bino(b− 1;n, pi,0) ≤ 1− α/2 (4.5)
If Numi in the new sample does not belong to [a, b], we reject the null hypothesis at
significance level α.
4.3.2.2 Behavior Mean Distance based Test (BMDT)
Another metric of interest is the mean of intra-cluster distance of each popular behavior
cluster. If there is a group of subtle behavior added to the network, the mean value of intra-
cluster distance may also change. Given the training data is large enough, we can accurately
estimate the mean value for each behavior cluster in the population. On the other hand, since
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the number of each popular behavior in any new sample is usually not large enough (< 30,
as the time interval under consideration is short), to test if the mean values are statistically
equal, one-sample t-test can be used [2]. So we have the null hypothesis H0 : di,new = di,0
(with Ha:di,new > di,0), where di,new is the mean intra-cluster distance of behavior cluster i in
the new sample, and di,0 is the true value of the mean. The t statistic is given by [2] [26]:
t =
di,new − di,0
si/
√
ni
(4.6)
where ni is the size of behavior i in the new sample, si =
√∑
(yi−di,new)2
ni−1
, and yj the
intra-cluster distance of member j in behavior cluster i. The degree of freedom of the t-test is
df = ni − 1. We reject the null hypothesis if t ≥ tα,ni−1, as we allow that di,new < di,0, which
refers to the case the behavior is closer to the centroid of behavior cluster i.
4.3.2.3 Node Behavior based Detection Algorithm
With two kinds of formal statistical tests, it is possible to design several detecting algo-
rithms. In this Chapter, we consider two of them. One is called independent test detection
algorithm (ITD), which treats two tests (BMDT or BPT) independently, and generates an
alarm when there are two or more rejections from any test in the l popular behaviors in the
new sample data. The ITD algorithm is straightforward and simple.
The next algorithm is called correlated test detection algorithm (CTD). It uses two pa-
rameters (r, l) and examines the first l popular behaviors. For each behavior cluster, if there
is at least 1 rejection of tests by BPT or BMDT, the corresponding behavior cluster is said to
be test positive. If at least r out of l clusters in the new sample are test positive, an alarm is
generated, otherwise, there is no alarm.
The reason of considering r behaviors together for detection in CTD is that, in practice
it is impossible to set the α to be 0. That is to say, there are always a small number of false
alarms. On the other hand, considering the subtle group behavior will affect more than one
popular behaviors of the testing data, if there is no unseen group behavior, it would rarely
happen that two or more popular behaviors do not pass the statistical tests at the same time
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Step 1: Training Data Processing
Identify first l popular behavior clusters and metrics of interest, e.g. proportion value,
and mean intra-cluster distance from the training data.
Step 2: New Sample Data Processing
Remove the known attacks from the new sample, and then group each behavior in the
new sample data to the closest behavior cluster by measuring the distance. Identify the
first l popular behaviors in the new sample data. Calculate the metrics of interest.
Step 3: Behavior Proportion based Test
For each popular behavior i in the sample data, if it satisfies the large sample case, use
equation (4.3) for the test, otherwise, use equation (4.4) and (4.5), at a given significance
level α.
Step 4: Behavior Mean Distance based Test
Apply t-test using equation (4.6) for each popular behavior in the sample data, at the
significance level α.
Step 5: Detection
For CTD: For each popular behavior i in the new sample data, if either test (or both)
is rejected, call popular behavior i test positive; if r out of l such popular behaviors are
test positive, generate an alarm, go to step 6. Otherwise, go to step 2.
For ITD: If there are two or more rejections in any test from l behaviors, generate an
alarm, go to step 6. Otherwise, go to step 2.
Step 6: Indentification of C&C Nodes
For each behavior Yi in the new data, find the closest behavior Xj in the training data,
update Yi by Yi = |Yi −Xj |. Use 2-means clustering to differentiate the C&C behaviors
from normal behaviors, as normal behaviors will have Yi = |Yi−Xj | around zero vector,
while C&C behaviors will be centered at a vector point other than zero (this step is only
designed for the simple case discussed in next section). Go to step 2 for another new
sample data.
Figure 4.4 CTD & ITD
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interval (it also means that the false positive rates of CTD will be less than α). In addition,
the main difference between two schemes is that CTD takes into account the proportion and
intra-distance effects jointly. Consequently, we formulate the above detection algorithms in
Fig. 3.3.
4.4 Fast and Optimal Detection using SPRT
In this section, we propose our fast and optimized detection algorithm, which performs
SPRT on node behaviors. We first propose a scheme to simplify node behaviors using Bernoulli
variables which can be further used by SPRT for fast detection. Further, by formulating the
detection problem as an optimization problem, we derive the optimal parameters for SPRT
under the worst case attack model, which can be used for optimized detection.
4.4.1 Fast and Optimized SPRT based Detection
4.4.1.1 Design of SPRT based Detection
For each behavior profile/cluster identified, we are interested in the intra-cluster distance of
each node (the distance from the node to its corresponding cluster centroid). Given the training
data large enough, intuitively, the empirical distribution of all these intra-cluster distances can
be considered a specific feature of the corresponding network. For any new sample data, if
it is from the same network, the distribution of intra-cluster distances should match with
the empirical distribution of the training data in a statistical manner. Statistical tests (e.g.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test) can be further used to compare these two distributions.
However, since the behavior itself may be affected by many unknown/unpredictable factors,
the node behaviors can be very dynamic in the training data and new sample data (that is,
many outliers) under the corresponding network. Therefore, rather than the distribution itself,
the median (or values around median) of the empirical distribution should be more stable than
the distribution or other parameters. Moreover, the stability of median in a distribution is
widely acknowledged and applied in many other areas, such as study of housing price change
and personal income change [3]. In addition, detection using KS test is also less efficient since
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it requires measuring all the nodes in the new sample before decision. In contrast, the SPRT
is the most optimal among all the tests under the same criterion (requires less sample size
on average to make the same decision) [15], so we first construct the node behavior in a way
suitable for SPRT.
Given the empirical distribution from the training data, we divide the distribution into two
areas by a value p0 around median (0.4 < p0 < 0.6), set the nodes in the lower 1−p0 percentile
with value 0 and those in the upper p0 percentile with value 1. In this way, we bernoullize
the empirical distribution using a Bernoulli variable. Since each node is independent from
others and can generate behavior randomly chosen from the behavior clusters, we further
associate each node with a Bernoulli variable B(p0) (our results in the evaluation part show
this Bernoullization works very well in terms of low false positive rates).
Consequently, with the empirical distribution of the training data, we obtain the corre-
sponding distance threshold (the smallest distance in the empirical distribution to be 1) under
H0, and use it to decide the Bernoulli value of the node behavior in the new sample data. If
there is any subtle C&C behavior in the new sample, the corresponding probability of being 1
in the new sample data will be larger than p0, by choosing this value to be p1 > p0, SPRT can
be used for fast detection (in terms of minimum sample size used when compared with other
statistical tests).
4.4.1.2 Optimization of SPRT based Detection
In general, p1 can take any value larger than p0 in the SPRT detection, and the smaller the
difference between p1 and p0, the more sensitive/precise of SPRT. However, the determination
of p1 should not be arbitrary especially in the worst case where botmaster knows the parameter
values used for SPRT.
That is to say, the assumption that the botmaster does not know any parameters used for
detection does not always hold in practice. Therefore, in the worst case, it is possible that
the botmaster knows all these parameters (e.g. by social engineering) and can further design
strategies to maximize the number of bots he can use during C&C while avoiding detection
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at the same time. Consequently, the value p1 should be optimized in a way to minimize the
distance between p1 and p0 and the number of bots that the botmaster can use without being
detected simultaneously. To achieve the above objective, we consider the following metrics for
SPRT.
First, we define the precision loss lp the difference between p1 and p0, denoted as lp = p1−p0
(the p1 value is not fixed here and in the following part of this section). As we can find from
Eq. 4.1, given p1 > p0, with all other parameter values known except p1 and E[n0] (we denote
E[n0] as n in the following for simplicity), n is only determined by p1 and vice versa. From
the viewpoint of the detector, we want to measure the change in proportion in the new sample
data as subtle as possible, this means we want p1 to be small (or as close as possible to p0)
under the same detection criterion, so does lp. Since in Eq. 4.1, the numerator is a constant,
the decrease of p1 will cause the increase on n. In this sense, we want n to be as large as
possible, given the size of the new sample data is N , we want n to be close to N (if the size of
new sample can be mapped to a distribution, e.g. Poisson, N can be chosen to be the mean
of the distribution, but it is out of the scope of this research).
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Figure 4.5 Combined loss (p0 = 0.5)
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Figure 4.6 Combined loss (p0 = 0.6)
On the other hand, consider the botmaster knows the choice of p1 and other parameters
(p0, α, β and hence n). Since the botnet needs to be reused multiple times, the botmaster
has to lower the chance of being detected to a certain level (denoted as γ, determined by the
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botmaster). Then 1−γ is the new false negative rate that the botmaster wants to achieve with
C&C traffic present and is denoted as β′ (β′ = 1 − γ). Consequently, given any new sample
with C&C traffic, he may want the SPRT test to be finished with average size n′ equal to n
(since the change of n′ from n is also a sign of anomaly) without being detected at β′ level.
This further indicates that the proportion (p′) in the new sample with C&C traffic should not
cause the change of n at β′ level with p0 and α unchanged. Therefore, from Eq. 4.1 we have:
n′ = E0(n
′) =
(1− α) ln β′1−α + α ln 1−β
′
α
p0 ln
p′
p0
+ (1− p0) ln 1−p′1−p0
= n (4.7)
p0 ln
p′
p0
+ (1− p0) ln 1− p
′
1− p0 =
(1− α) ln β′1−α + α ln 1−β
′
α
n
(4.8)
From Eq. 4.7 and 4.8, we know that p′ is a function of p1 (hence also a function of n based
on Eq. 4.1). Further, from the botmaster view point, it is very likely that all the bots doing
C&C are tested in the SPRT (e.g. one way to achieve this is to inspect the infection history
of each node, and use those having longer infection histories first in the SPRT) and have value
1. Therefore, the maximum percentage of nodes in the sample data that can be used by the
botmaster without being detected is given by: p′ ∗n/N (N is the size of the new sample data).
Denote this percentage as the uncontrollable loss lu (lu = p
′ ∗ n/N). We want this value to
be as small as possible to limit the maximum number of nodes used by the botmaster without
being detected.
To summarize, from the perspective of the SPRT detector, we want both precision and
uncontrollable losses to be as small as possible. Without loss of generality, define the cost
function c = lu + lp, then we want to find an optimized n (hence p1, since they are only
dependent on each other, denote n = f(p1)) such that the total cost is minimized. Therefore,
we formulate the detection problem as the following optimization problem:
min
1<n<N,n=f(p1)
c(n) = lu(n) + lp(n)
where
lu(n) = p1(n)− p0, lp(n) = n ∗ p′(n)/N
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For each value of n, the values of p1(n) and p
′(n) can be derived from Eq. 4.7 and 4.1. As
there is no closed form solution for this problem, a numerical method is further used to find
the optimum value of c(n), with other parameters user chosen and fixed (including α, β, p0, γ).
For example, given p0 = 0.5 or p0 = 0.6 , α = β = 0.01, γ = 0.05 and N = 200, the relations
between c and n are illustrated by Fig. 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. And it is easy to find that
when n = 40 or n = 30, the cost function reaches its minimum at each p0. The corresponding
p1 can be further determined by numerical method from Eq. 4.1. In practice, given empirical
distribution from the training data, user chosen fixed parameter values and the range of the
total sample size N in a network, a table of optimal values for SPRT can be further designed
in advance to speed up the optimization process. Therefore, the optimal SPRT detection
algorithm can be summarized in Fig. 4.7:
In general, step 2 is not necessary, as any attack traffic including P2P botnet C&C traffic
should deviate from the normal traffic and can be detected by SPRT-FOD scheme. However,
it is possible that there are attacks unrelated to the P2P botnets in the network, and usually
the volume of the C&C traffic is much smaller than these attacks, to detect and identify the
C&C traffic more efficiently, it is better to remove the known attacks before SPRT-FOD.
The optimized problem above can be also considered in another way, from the perspective
of p0 and p
′. Although different, the two schemes reach the same value of n (hence (p1))
when the combined cost is minimized. And it is discussed in Appendix 5. In addition, the
SPRT-FOD can be also formulated in terms of cost, which is discussed in Appendix 4.
4.4.2 Discussions
In this and previous sections, we first proposed two anomaly detection algorithms based on
the behavior profiles identified and formal statistical tests. There are two assumptions made
in our detection schemes. One is that we need to assume the proportion metric is statistically
stable across normal traffic samples, and this should also hold for different networks. The other
is that the mean of intra-cluster distance has to be statistically stable in different networks.
Therefore, in the evaluation part of this Chapter, we first validate the two assumptions using
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Step 1: Training Data Processing
Identify all the behavior clusters, measure the intra-cluster distances from the training
data, and derive the empirical distribution of the intra-cluster distance. Bernoullize the
distance using value p0 and record the smallest distance ds of upper p0 percentile.
Step 2: New Sample Data Processing
Remove the known attacks from the new sample.
Step 3: Random Selection and Bernoullization
Randomly choose a node from the new sample, find its belonging behavior cluster and
corresponding intra-cluster distance, bernoullize the distance Yi using value ds.
Step 4: Apply SPRT-FOD
Apply the SPRT using the optimal value p1, if Yi = 0, decrease Si with ln(1−p1)/(1−p0),
otherwise, increase Si lnp1/p0. If Si goes down to reach the lower bound A or upper
bound B, go to step 5. Otherwise, go to step 3.
Step 5: Decision
If A is reached, pass the sample, go to step 2. Otherwise, generate an alarm, go to step
6.
Step 6: Identification (optional)
For each behavior vector Yi in the new data, find the closest behavior Xj in the training
data, update Yi by Yi = |Yi − Xj |. Use 2-means clustering to differentiate the C&C
behaviors from normal behaviors, as normal behaviors will have Yi = |Yi − Xj | around
zero vector, while C&C behaviors will be centered at a vector point other than zero (this
step is only designed for the simple case detection discussed in next section). Go to step
2 for another new sample data.
Figure 4.7 SPRT-FOD
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real user traces. The traces are from different networks and different dates and times. Most
of the traces considered suggest our assumptions hold in real environments.
Secondly, we proposed an SPRT based fast and optimized anomaly detection algorithm
(SPRT-FOD) based on bernoullized behaviors and SPRT tests. We consider the fact that,
although behaviors from different nodes can be considered independent, they are of different
types. Hence, the node behaviors are not identical in general. However, by considering the
intra-cluster distances (or residuals) and removing the outliers’ impact (by Bernoullizing), we
can consider the bernoullized intra-cluster distance approximately identical.
Therefore, we can achieve approximate i.i.d. distribution of node behavior, which is a
prerequisite for SPRT. And the evaluation results of SPRT-FOD further comfirm this approx-
imation. Moreover, the derivation of the optimum solution for SPRT is not only applicable for
SPRT-FOD in this Chapter, but also applicable for general SPRT based schemes in network
security (e.g. BotSniffer in [28]). In addition, the SPRT-FOD should be able to work with
any behavior based approach, and we believe the performance of SPRT-FOD can be further
improved by any approach that can better capture the node behaviors.
4.5 Evaluations
We use the LBNL enterprise trace data which is the latest publicly available trace to
evaluate our approaches. Six representative subnets are considered, each subnet is combined
by two traces captured at different times and dates. We use time intervals of 10 minutes
to profile the node behavior. To obtain more accurate results, we validate and evaluate the
proposed approaches in a more rigorous way than that in Chapter 2. That is, we pick each
time interval as the new data set, and the rest time intervals as the training data. Therefore,
for each 2-hour trace, 12 possible tests are done for each subnet in the evaluation. Specifically,
we consider the trace data captured in subnet002, subnet003, subnet008, subnet010, subnet021
and subnet026 in this Chapter. Table 4.1 lists the information of the trace under consideration.
We do not limit ourselves to the trace of a specific time, the largest gap in time is over 10
hours (20041215-0510, 20041216-1618).
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Table 4.1 Data information
trace size date duration distinct nodes
subnet002 291M 20050106-1626, 20050107-1526 2h 83
subnet003 1.07G 20041215-1142, 20041216-1418 2h 1005
subnet008 340M 20041215-0510, 20041216-1618 2h 1086
subnet010 199M 20041215-1443, 20041216-1719 2h 241
subnet021 239M 20041215-1012, 20041216-1016 2h 194
subnet026 285M 20050106-1423, 20050107-1323 2h 474
4.5.1 Assumption Validation of ITD & CTD
As discussed in the previous section, it is important that the assumptions are valid (over
a relatively long time, e.g. days or weeks) to ensure the detection approaches work in a real
environment. Two assumptions were made for the statistical tests. One is that the proportion
of the popular behaviors should be statistically stable across different times, for any single
subnet. The other assumption is the mean intra-cluster distance should be statistically stable
at different times, for any single subnet.
Table 4.2 Proportion test results (1: reject; 0: not reject)
trace cluster t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 t=11 t=12
subnet002 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet003 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,1,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0)
subnet008 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet010 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet021 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet026 (1,2,3) (0,1,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
Table 4.3 t-test results (1: reject; 0: not reject)
trace cluster t=1 t=2 t=3 t=4 t=5 t=6 t=7 t=8 t=9 t=10 t=11 t=12
subnet002 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet003 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet008 (1,2,3) (0,1,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,1) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet010 (1,2,3) (0,1,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet021 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
subnet026 (1,2,3) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (1,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,1,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
For the proportion case, from Table 4.2, 18 (tests with value 1) out of 216 times (18/216 =
0.083) that the test wrongly rejects the null hypothesis, which is not far from the significance
level at α = 0.05. Especially, the first popular behaviors in subnet003, subnet008 and pot010
are not very stable for the proportion test. But other results do show certain stability of the
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proportion metric, so we believe the assumption on the proportion test can be considered valid
at least for the LBNL trace.
Similarly, from Table 4.3, 8 out of 216 times (8/216 = 0.037) that the test wrongly rejects
the null hypothesis, this also matches the significance level at α = 0.05 very well. In addition,
the test on mean intra-cluster distance is more stable (as compared with proportion metric)
across the traces under consideration. Therefore, we conclude that the assumptions are valid
for the analysis in this Chapter.
4.5.2 False Positive Rate
4.5.2.1 False Positive Rate of ITD & CTD
Table 4.4 shows the false positive rates when different detection schemes are used. We first
set l = 3 and r = 2 for CTD and l = 3 for ITD. We can find that both schemes achieve low
overall false positives rates (both less than 0.05). Especially, the CTD based detection reports
only one false positive (subnet003 at interval 4) for the data we have analyzed. Further, if we
remove the first behavior cluster in both subnet008 and subnet003 in the detection, there is
no false alarm from both ITD and CTD schemes and the overall false positive rate drop to 0
for the traces we have analyzed. Therefore, from Table 4.4, we can find that although there
are chances that the tests are wrongly rejected, by jointly taking into account the test results
from different behavior clusters (especially stable ones), we can achieve a lower false positive
rate.
Table 4.4 False positive rates (fpr) for each trace
trace ITD (l = 3) ITD (l = 2) CTD ((l, r) = (3, 2)) CTD ((l, r) = (2, 2))
subnet002 0 0 0 0
subnet003 8.3% 0 8.3% 0
subnet008 8.3% 0 0 0
subnet010 0 0 0 0
subnet021 0 0 0 0
subnet026 0 0 0 0
overall 2.78% 0 1.39% 0
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4.5.2.2 False Positive Rate of SPRT-FOD
Table 4.5 shows the false positive rates for SPRT-FOD when different networks are consid-
ered. We set α = β = 0.01 for all the networks considered and p0 is chosen from [0.4 − 0.6].
For each trace, we also divide it into 12 time intervals, and do the SPRT-FOD 1000 times to
get the average false positive rate of that interval. The final false positive rate is averaged over
the 12 time intervals. We can find the SPRT-FOD approach achieves low false positives rates
(all around 0.02) in most traces which are not far from the predetermined α = 0.01 value. And
the overall false positive rate is also around 0.02. Therefore, as discussed in [133], the practical
false positive rate is usually close to the predetermined α value, we believe the false positive
rates are acceptable (at least) for the networks we have analyzed.
Table 4.5 False positive rates
trace false positive rates
subnet003 0.012
subnet008 0.021
subnet010 0.030
subnet021 0.024
subnet026 0.015
overall 0.0204
4.5.3 Detecting the C&C in P2P Botnets
In this section, we consider two possible scenarios. One is called simple scenario where
known botnet (Nugache bot) traffic [129] [135] is used for evaluation. This is achieved by
adding the nodes generating Nugachebot traffic to the normal trace for evaluation. This is
similar to the test used in the literature [27], where nodes using fixed port to generate bot
traffic are independent with nodes generating normal traffic. Further, by noticing that any
P2P botnet can randomly choose any port for C&C (especially those used in the training data),
and the botmaster can avoid being detected by using those ports for C&C, we also consider this
more realistic case in the evaluation. That is to say, in addition to generating the C&C traffic
from a randomly chosen port, we enable each bot to randomly choose the port recorded in the
training data for C&C, in addition, we let the bots only communicate with peers recorded in
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the training data to test our schemes.
4.5.3.1 Detection in Simple Case
According to [135] [129] [136], the captured Nugache bot has a peerlist containing 22 peers
and uses TCP port 8 for C&C. To evaluate the performance of our detection schemes in the
simple case, we use the last time interval as the testing data, and the earlier time intervals
as the training data. For the testing data, in addition to the nodes generating the normal
trace traffic, we add 100 Nugachebot nodes generating C&C traffic. To obtain the bot traffic,
we run Nugache bot over VMware and capture the traffic on port 8. Since we also want to
take into account PUSH based P2P botnets, we only consider one round of C&C (e.g. there
is no frequent communication among peers). We use the detection rate for the evaluation; the
detection rate is defined as the number of bots identified over the total number of bots in the
data. In CTD algorithm, we set l = 3 and r = 2. Table 4.6 shows the results of detection rate
under trace subnet002, subnet010, subnet021 and subnet026. We can find, for all these traces,
both of our schemes achieve 100% detection rate.
Table 4.6 Detection rate of ITD, CTD & SPRT-FOD under simple case
trace CTD detection rate ITD detection rate SPRT-FOD detection rate
subnet002 100% 100% 100%
subnet010 100% 100% 100%
subnet021 100% 100% 100%
subnet026 100% 100% 100%
From Table 4.6, our schemes achieve good performance in terms of detection rates under
the simple case. This is not surprising, and the reason behind is that, usually TCP port 8 is
not a common port, and connections of 22 IPs on port 8 are also rare. As nodes used for bots
are independent of normal nodes in the trace, the behaviors generated by the Nugache bot
should deviate from any normal behavior clusters greatly, resulting in sufficient evidences for
detection.
However, the results in this simple case only provide limited support for evaluation of our
schemes, as it is very easy to design a series of variation of Nugache bot in a way such that
each bot can choose any port used by normal users in the same network for C&C. And it is
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not necessary that two bots share the same port for C&C (e.g. one can choose TCP port 80,
another can choose TCP port 21, etc.).
Moreover, usually the nodes generating bot traffic should not be independent of nodes
generating normal traffic (e.g. one node can generate both bot and normal traffic from bot
program and normal user respectively). The Nugache bot of this kind is much smarter and
stealthier than the original one; it is also more practical in implementation. Therefore, we be-
lieve experiments of detecting this more advanced bot should be considered for more thorough
and general evaluations.
4.5.3.2 Detection in Realistic Case
Since there are no traces available for the more advanced Nugachebot discussed above,
we simulate the Nugachebot C&C behavior and add it to the normal nodes to evaluate the
performance of our detection approaches.
In detail, we let the node generating normal traffic at the testing time interval will also
generate a small amount of P2P botnet C&C traffic. The P2P botnet traffic at each node is
generated to a port randomly chosen from the recorded ports in the training data, and the
peers are also chosen at random from the destinations recorded in the training data. That is,
we consider the bot knows the approximate range of destinations and services of normal traffic
in its network, only communicates with peers and uses the port recorded in the training data
for C&C. Mixing the bot traffic with normal traffic in each node means the bot traffic can hide
itself in the normal traffic. In addition, we reduce the peerlist to be 10. By simulating the
environments this way, we simulate the realistic case that is most favoring the P2P botnet.
In this realistic case, what we are interested is the alarm rate, which refers to detecting
bot existence and generating an alarm, because this is the most important step without which
there is no chance to identify bots. Also in this case, it is much harder to identify the bot, as
bot traffic is correlated with the normal traffic. Therefore, we evaluate our schemes in this case
using alarm rate and leave the identification of individual bots and detection rate as future
work.
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For each trace, we pick one time interval as new sample data, simulate P2P botnet behaviors
only on the active nodes in that interval, and use the rest intervals as the training data. We run
the simulation 1000 times for each interval, therefore, there are all together 12000 instances of
the P2P botnet scenarios for a 2-hour long trace. We then calculate the alarm probability for
each trace. We also set the P2P botnet behavior occurs in only a portion of the total nodes
(randomly chosen) to test the sensitivity of our approach (each test also runs 12000 times).
Each bot will connect to 10 peers during C&C. Like the common case, there are no frequent
connections between any peers. Among all its peers, we consider there is 50% chance that a
peer is online (a peer can be turned off, thus unavailable in the botnet). So on average, each bot
contacts ten peers, and finds five online peers available for communication. Also, we consider
the most concise communications between peers. That is, each peer sends the command using
TCP (or any protocol over TCP), so taking into account the setup phase, there are at least 3
packets sent for one command from the sender.
A. ITD & CTD
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Figure 4.8 Average alarm rate of ITD & CTD for subnet003, 008
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We consider trace subnet003 and subnet008 in this case as an example to evaluate the ITD
and CTD schemes. Since the first behavior cluster is not stable in previous sections, we only
consider the second and third clusters in this section. That is, we set l = 2 for ITD and l = 2
r = 2 for CTD. The alarm rates of CTD and ITD in Fig. 4.8 are very good (> 95%) when the
percentage of nodes being bots is over 70%. This indicates both schemes perform well when
there are enough samples of bots available in the network. In addition, the small standard
deviations shown at the bottom also suggest that both schemes are stable.
However, when the percentage of nodes being bots decreases from 70% to 30%, CTD based
scheme decreases much faster than ITD based scheme. This indicates ITD is less affected by
the percentage change at this interval. This also shows that ITD based scheme is much more
robust than CTD, as CTD treats BPT and BMDT jointly, which is much more conservative.
Therefore, during implementation, the ITD and CTD schemes can be further used jointly with
certain number of honeypots randomly deployed in the network. That is, if a large portion of
honeypots used are infected by the bot, it indicates that a large portion of nodes may also be
infected, then either CTD or ITD can be used. Otherwise, ITD is preferred.
On the other hand, when the percentage is below 30%, both schemes decrease sharply,
and is mainly because the bot samples are not enough to cause notable statistical changes
on behavior clusters. A direct enhancement is to consider additional stable popular behavior
clusters during detection. On the other hand, from the perspective of the botmaster, since
the botnet will be reused multiple times, to ensure the chance of being detected smaller than
a certain value (e.g. less than 10%), the number of bots in the network where our detection
scheme (for example, CTD) is applied should be no more than 10% of the total nodes, if the
botmaster has a good knowledge of the network where the bots are located.
B. SPRT-FOD
From Fig. 4.9, we can find the SPRT-FOD works quite well (> 90%) when there are over
14 percent of nodes in the corresponding network generating C&C behavior. This indicates
that SPRT-FOD can achieve good performance in different networks even when there are only
a low percentage of nodes used by the botmaster for C&C in the realistic scenarios. Especially,
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the detection rate is over 95% when only 15% of nodes is used as bots for all the networks
considered. The small standard deviations shown at the bottom also suggest that the proposed
behavior based SPRT-FOD scheme is stable. In contrast, when the percentage is lower than
10%, there is a sharp decrease in detection rate.
Moreover, since we do not have any infection history data on each node in the network,
we just randomly select the nodes for SPRT. In practice, the infection history can be further
used, so we regard the alarm rates in this section the lower bound of our scheme. On the other
hand, we find that, when the node percentage is as low as 5%, although the alarm rate is not
good from the security perspective (around 35%), it is also not good for the botmaster, as it
is much larger than the predetermined γ = 0.05 by the botmaster.
In addition, as shown in [51], when the number of online peers a bot can communicate is
less than a certain number (e.g. 4), the P2P botnet can not be well connected and is sensitive
to removals. This is also confirmed by our study on P2P botnets. Therefore, we believe the
peerlist size chosen in this evaluation can be also considered realistic. And the performance of
SPRT-FOD can be further improved if the botmaster increases the peerlist size in P2P botnets.
4.5.4 Discussions and Future Work
4.5.4.1 Discussions
As we can find in the evaluation part, in general, the SPRT-FOD scheme outperforms the
ITD and CTD schemes. The main reason is because in SPRT-FOD scheme, we make use
of all the network information to do the SPRT test. In contrast, in CTD/ITD scheme, only
partial network information is used in detection, e.g. up to three most popular behaviors are
considered. Therefore, when using more stable behaviors information in the test, it is possible
to improve the performance of CTD and ITD.
However, this improvement requires checking more number of nodes during BMDT and
BPT. On the other hand, only a small number of nodes need to be checked in SPRT-FOD,
which is the direct benefit from SPRT. We can also apply our detection schemes by monitoring
a subset of nodes that has a higher probability of being infected, depending on the version of
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Figure 4.9 Detection rate of SPRT-FOD for subnet003, 008, 010, 026
OS, history of being infected, number of abnormal behaviors in the past, etc.
In addition, as shown in the evaluations on the realistic case, we consider all the destina-
tions bots communicates with being recorded in the training data. In practice, it will rarely
happen and at least a portion of destinations used by bots will be unseen in the training data.
Therefore, an additional attribute recording the number of unseen destinations during behavior
profiling will further improve the performance of ITD/CTD and SPRT-FOD in detection. On
the other hand, we regard the evaluation results the lower bound performance of all proposed
schemes.
4.5.4.2 Possible Evasion
There are several possible ways for P2P botnets to evade proposed detection approaches.
Firstly, the botmaster can evade the detection by using random and long response (hours or
days) delay in C&C. This is to reduce the bot sample size available in each detection period
such that there is no evident statistical change in the node behaviors. If this happens, possible
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solutions include extending the detection time window (e.g. from 10 to 20 minutes or longer)
and considering additional attributes such as unseen destination and DNS. As the P2P botnet
may connect to the destinations unseen in the training data and use DNS during C&C. We can
also use weight for different attributes according to the importance to the detection. Currently,
we set all attributes with weight 1.
On the other hand, as noted in [97], if bots are forced to use a very long response delay, the
utility of the botnet to botmaster is reduced or limited because the botmaster can no longer
command his bots promptly and reliably. For example, the computers infected with bot may
be shut down or disconnected from the Internet by the users or security professionals during
this time, hence become removed from the botnet.
Furthermore, it is also possible that botnets may try to utilize popular destinations and
services that match the ones used in the corresponding subnet for C&C to evade detection, e.g.
use HTTP and IRC protocols and corresponding servers for C&C. However, for any subnet,
the number popular destinations are very small when compared to the unpopular ones, and
the popular destinations usually have higher security protection, which makes it harder for
C&C. Moreover, the use of popular services in C&C gives additional information on potential
protocols used in C&C. Consequently, the detection problem of this kind is very similar to
the ones considered in centralized botnet detection, protocol-specific detection schemes can be
further applied, which is out of the scope of this Chapter.
Last but not least, covert channels [118] can be used to by botnets hide their actual C&C
communications. It is widely acknowledged and in general, communication randomization,
mimicry attacks and covert channel represent limitations for all traffic-based detection ap-
proaches [97]. Therefore, to achieve a better performance, detection schemes at different levels
(e.g. network-wide, protocol-specific, host-based and content-based) should be used jointly to
make evasion more difficult.
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4.5.4.3 Future Work
To detect the P2P botnet using multiple protocols for C&C, the most difficult part is
to detect its existence. As shown in the evaluation section, the proposed ITD, CTD and
SPRT-FOD schemes can achieve good performance in both simple and realistic cases. On the
other hand, once the existence of C&C is detected, either attack correlation based techniques
[27] or active approaches [30] can be used to locate the bot. However, to achieve a more
accurate detection for ITD and CTD in the realistic case, in addition to considering more
popular behavior profiles, time effects (daytime or nighttime, weekday or weekend) should be
further considered during behavior profiling and detection, as the behavior profiles will be quite
different in different times, e.g. backup traffic is usually generated in the nighttime.
In addition, there are normal behaviors that only occur occasionally, e.g. payroll at the
end of each month or final grades at the end of each semester. In this case, a whitelist of
normal but uncommon behavior profiles will help to reduce the false positive rates greatly,
especially for ITD and CDT. Further, more trace data from different enterprise networks are
also required for a thorough evaluation. To implementation of our schemes, TCP traffic can
be divided into P2P and non-P2P traffic, detection schemes of each traffic part can be further
implemented. We will consider the above in our future work.
On the other hand, as noted in the previous section, the node behavior simplification ap-
proach and the SPRT-FOD/ITD/CTD scheme in this Chapter should be able to work with
any other node behavior profiling schemes. And the performance of SPRT-FOD could be
further improved by any other better behavior profiling schemes in the literature. Possible
enhancements include considering additional representative attributes, using weight for differ-
ent attributes according to their importance for the detection, classifying the destinations into
inner and outer parts.
One main concern of our scheme is the unbounded sample size needed under certain situ-
ations for SPRT [130] [132]. In this case, truncated SPRT can be further used if the sample
size required is too large before decision. Also, since each round of SPRT requires making
a decision (stop or continue), the performance can be further improved by the group based
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SPRT method [132].
It is also worth mentioning that for the t-test used in detection, in addition to independency,
it requires that the sample has equal variance and residuals are normally distributed. In our
analysis of the data, we found that a small number of samples do not have equal variance
and their residuals are not normally distributed. To solve these issues, transformations (e.g.
Box-Cox) can be used before the t-test to achieve equal variance, nonparametric test (e.g. One
Sample Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test) can be used to solve the normality issue. As the t-test
provides correct results for the data considered in this Chapter, we regard it one of our future
work.
4.6 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we discussed the problem of detecting the P2P botnet via its C&C. Based
on the observation of correlations of node behaviors at different times, we used a correlation
based node behavior profiling scheme which can be further used for statistical tests. By
validating the assumptions, we designed algorithms based on statistical tests to check if there
is any unseen subtle group activity from C&C in P2P botnets. We also propose a fast and
optimized detection scheme based on SPRT under the worst case attack model. The results of
the experiments on the real user traces from enterprise networks are encouraging in terms of
high detection and low false positive rate.
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CHAPTER 5. A Novel Background Traffic Modeling Structure for NIDS
Evaluations
Realistic background traffic modeling is one of the most important problems in applications
such as NIDS (network intrusion detection system) evaluation. However, although traffic is
driven by users (or nodes) in a network, modeling it by individual node does not scale well
and requires longer traces. Most current researches in the literature model the aggregate
network traffic by individual application or application mix in the network. They thereby
lose the traffic characteristic at the node level, e.g. they model/generate traffic of the same
application from different nodes by the same underlying distribution, and choice of destinations
by different nodes are also from the same underlying distribution. Consequently, the traffic can
not be considered realistically generated from real nodes. In this Chapter, we propose a novel
traffic modeling structure that not only models the traffic at the node level but also has good
scalability. This is achieved by designing a behavior based traffic modeling framework. We also
show that most traffic models are special cases of this framework. In the initial evaluations, we
evaluate the proposed framework under real user traces from enterprise networks and obtain
several important observations which could be helpful in generating better realistic background
traffic.
5.1 Introduction
Traffic modeling is widely used in many areas of computer networks, such as protocol
evaluations, buffer management evaluations and NIDS evaluations. When used for NIDS eval-
uations in network security, it usually refers to modeling both attack and background traffic.
Its main application is to thoroughly evaluate and compare different NIDS (or distributed
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NIDS) performances in terms of robustness and capabilities [83]. It is also used to eliminate
any weakness [83] in NIDSs before practical implementation. With the extensive growth in
both diversity and volume of malwares in the current Internet, there has been an increasing
demand on NIDSs. Hence, traffic modeling plays a more and more important role for NIDS
evaluations.
In this Chapter, we focus on background traffic modeling to support NIDS evaluations.
Unlike common traffic generators, the traffic generator for NIDS (especially anomaly based
NIDS) requires realism in a much wider range. For example, other than the packet size and
inter arrival time information maintained by traffic generators for protocol evaluations, user
level information (in this Chapter, unless otherwise stated, the notions of user and node are
exchangeable) has to be considered, including choice of services and destinations, user think
time and payload content. This makes the modeling problem more challenging.
In general, in addition to privacy issues, the challenges for realistic background traffic
modeling lie in:
1. User behavior heterogeneity: users differ in their preferences on services, destinations and
the corresponding amounts of traffic generated. Moreover, these preferences are dynamic
over time.
2. Host heterogeneity: hosts have different processing capacities, protocol types, versions
and parameters (e.g. TCP window size).
3. Diversity in traffic types and characteristics: for example, packet size, inter-arrival time.
4. Network size: a network may consist of many individual nodes, which makes it difficult
and unscalable to model traffic from each individual node.
5. Incomplete sampling: in high speed networks, it is impossible to capture all the traffic
information by sampling, which makes modeling more difficult.
To solve the above challenges, most current work ([81] [87] [88] [59] [77] [82] [76] [79]) in
the literature models the aggregate network traffic by individual application or application
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mix. To summarize, for individual-application based models, they extract the important traf-
fic characteristics of each application from individual node. Since nodes can be considered
independent of each other, they pool each traffic characteristic across all the nodes in the
network to build traffic models. Similarly, for application-mix based models, they abstract all
the application communications as file transfers, and pool the important traffic characteristics
in each individual node in the network to model the total application mix.
However, despite successes in modeling the aggregate network traffic, current modeling
schemes lose the traffic characteristic at the node level, e.g. they model/generate traffic of
the same application from different nodes by the same underlying distribution, and choice of
destinations by different nodes are also from the same underlying distribution. Consequently,
the traffic can not be considered realistically generated from real nodes. In other words, as will
be shown in Section 3, most current models assume the nodes are homogeneous or identical
in behaviors. The node behavior considered in this Chapter refers to capturing the preference
patterns of using the network from different users. As a consequence, current modeling schemes
may have difficulties when there is no assumption on behavior homogeneity. For example, as
will be shown in the evaluation section, current models may have difficulties in modeling the
case where in a network, certain nodes continue generating HTTP requests with small mean
or variation in size, while others (more active ones) keep generating HTTP requests with large
mean or variation in size. In addition, they also have problems modeling the realistic traffic
from nodes with the same mix of applications (such as HTTP and Email), but towards different
destination ranges.
Therefore, we propose a solution to the above issue and extend the current work by relaxing
the assumption on node behavior homogeneity. This is achieved by proposing a behavior
based traffic modeling framework that captures the network traffic from the viewpoint of node
behaviors. In addition, although the trace data used for the experiments in this Chapter
can not represent all the traffic in different networks, our main purpose is to use them as an
example to help understand and generate better realistic background traffic. Specially, we
want to answer the following questions on traffic modeling:
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1. From the node behavior perspective, how do node behaviors affect the precision in net-
work traffic generation. We propose a way to relate the node behavior to the precision
of traffic generation.
2. From the node behavior perspective, each node behavior may consist of a combination of
different applications, and it is very likely certain application exists in two or more node
behaviors. Consequently, does the traffic from the same application but different node
behaviors share same properties? We show it is not necessary for such traffic to share all
the properties from our experiments and statistical tests.
3. From the node behavior perspective, how does the framework relate to the current work
in traffic modeling? We show that most traffic models can be considered as special cases
of our framework.
In this Chapter, as a majority of the network security related traffic is transmitted via TCP,
we focus ourselves on the traffic modeling framework for TCP, and it will be straightforward
to extend the framework to support UDP. In our evaluations, as the enterprise network is less
studied for over 15 years [10], we evaluate the proposed framework under real user data from
enterprise networks and make several important observations in Chapter 5.4 which could be
helpful in generating better realistic background traffic.
The following of this Chapter is organized as follows: Chapter 5.2 describes the related work
in the recent literature on traffic modeling. In Chapter 5.3, we bring forward the proposed
framework by first giving a detailed comparison on assumptions used in the existing work,
and then discuss the correlation based node behavior extraction engine. In Chapter 5.4, we
evaluate the framework using the real trace data from enterprise networks and answer the
above questions by the experiment results and statistical test. As empirical modeling is widely
used in current traffic models, we also evaluate the performance of empirical modeling under
this framework on selected parameters for web traffic. We conclude the Chapter in Chapter
5.5.
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5.2 Related Work
Traffic modeling has been widely used in many areas of computer networks, such as buffer
management and QoS provision. One of the classic examples to illustrate how great impact
a traffic model can have on the evaluation results is discussed in [94], where performances of
RED (Random Early Detection) and FIFO (First-In First-Out) under web traffic models are
discussed. It is shown in [94] that RED has little benefit when compared with FIFO in the case
where realistic web-like traffic (finite sources and small data transfer) is used in evaluations. In
contrast, as shown in [93], if only unrealistic traffic (infinite sources and large data transfer) is
used, RED can significantly outperform FIFO. This difference in performance is mainly caused
by the different traffic models. Therefore, accurately modeling and generation of the Internet
traffic plays a very important role in evaluations of any network mechanism including NIDS.
5.2.1 Real Trace vs Realistic Modeling
The traffic generator for NIDS proposed in the literature can be classified into two groups:
real trace (e.g. DARPA data sets) and realistic modeling. A natural approach for addressing
representativeness in both flows and content is to take empirical traces from real networks
for oﬄine analysis [59], and the DARPA data set, which was developed at Lincoln Lab in
1998-1999, is one of the most well known traces for oﬄine NIDS testing. However, as pointed
out by [89], there is no statistical information on the real traffic published; the data rates and
their variations are never a variable in the test environment; there is no knowledge on how
many false alarms background traffic alone would generate. In addition, the size of the training
data may be insufficient. Therefore, although real traces naturally preserves all the contents
needed for NIDS testing, they suffers from the issues such as privacy concern and inflexible
to generate counterparts in experiments. In this Chapter, we focus ourselves mainly on the
realistic modeling in the literature.
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5.2.2 Packet Level Modeling
Realistic traffic modeling, in contrast, is able to generate traffic synthetically. In principle,
it can produce traces for oﬄine tests or in live streams for online tests [59]. To generate such
traffic, the simplest way is to generate packets at packet level according to the packet char-
acteristics (exact copy or preserve some statistical properties) extracted from the monitored
network. Generators of this kind e.g. TCPreplay [90], are used to replay packets that were
previously captured with the tcpdump program. The packet level generators are not suitable
to generate background traffic for NIDS evaluations. This is mainly because there is no trans-
port or upper layer information maintained in these generators; hence the packets generated
are unaware of the current network condition. In other words, they are called the open-loop
generator [92], as there is no feedback loop preserved between the endpoints and the network.
Therefore, they are often used to generate attack traffic [91], such as SYN flood.
Figure 5.1 Relations between different models
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5.2.3 Advanced Modeling
More advanced traffic generators on source level that takes feedback into account have been
proposed in the literature. They can generate closed-loop traffic that reacts to the network
conditions as real endpoints do, which is far more realistic than the packet level generators.
The general relationship between the closed-loop traffic generators in the latest literature is
illustrated in Fig. 5.1. Among all the generators, Harpoon [81] and a-b-t model [87] [88] have
been widely acknowledged. To be specific, as illustrated in Fig. 5.2, Harpoon operates at
flow level and takes into account the destination diversity and models the distribution of file
size, connection arrival, src IP, dst IP and active sessions for traffic generation in TCP. It also
takes into account the traffic in UDP, where constant packet rate, a fixed-interval periodic
ping-pong, and an exponentially distributed ping-pong are considered.
Figure 5.2 Structure of Harpoon [81]
The a-b-t model models the traffic from any application in TCP at connection level by
the request size (a), response size (b), and waiting time of the next request (t). According
to [75], a sequential a-b-t connection vector has the form Ci = (e1, e2, . . . , en) with n ≥ 1
epoch tuples. An epoch tuple has the form ej = (aj , taj , bj , tbj) where aj is the jth ADU
(application data unit) sent from the connection initiator to the connection acceptor; bj is
the jth ADU sent in the opposite direction; taj is the duration of the quiet time between the
arrival of the last segment of aj and the departure of the first segment of bj ; and tbj is either
the duration of the quiet time between bj and aj +1 (for connections with at least epochs), or
the quiet time between the last data segment. And as mentioned in [88], it is easy to extend
105
the a-b-t model to support UDP. For example, the HTTP application in Fig. 5.3 is modeled
as ((329, 0, 403, 0.12), (403, 0, 25821, 3.12), (356, 0, 1198, 15.3)).
Figure 5.3 Structure of a-b-t model [75]
There many schemes proposed in the literature on traffic modeling for individual applica-
tion, we are only interested in the recent and representative ones in this section. In [59], the
authors propose a traffic generation framework named Trident, the background traffic genera-
tor is modified from Harpoon [81]. In brief, as illustrated in Fig. [59] they use three or more
states to represent the evolution of any given application, and generate traffic from the packet
pool of each state. Accordingly, an empirical distribution of the packet content is maintained
in each state. Other parameters like flowsize, numberpackets, activesessions are considered to
regulate the overall traffic volume such that application mix can be tuned as desired. Like
Harpoon, destination and source IP distributions are further considered, with the simplifica-
tion that each flow is transferred between points randomly selected from those distributions.
Unlike other models in the literature, the authors in [59] feed the traffic from Trident to the
known NIDSs such as Bro, Snort and Bleeding Snort to evaluate its performance in terms of
false alarms.
Given characters in the payload of the background traffic are not uniformly distributed, the
authors in [58] find out that the payload distribution could affect the signature based NIDSs
greatly. Consequently, they propose a scheme to model the payload distribution for signature
based NIDS testing. They propose a payload model that is based on empirical distributions
of single-byte pattern for different applications. Several important observations are made in
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Figure 5.4 Trident model of http [59]
this Chapter, including: 1) NIDS performance is highly sensitive to the underlying traffic and
that simple stream-based analysis (e.g., performed with tools like ttcp) as well as trace-based
analysis can easily be misleading; 2) they have compared the payloads from single-byte pattern
modeling to real traffic traces, showing that the model error is in most cases insignificant.
Therefore, it is promising in generating realistic traffic for signature based NIDS testing.
In [83], a Markov chain based approach is used to model the traffic of individual application.
With a focus on HTTP traffic from a web server perspective, the authors in [83] treat each web
link as a Markov state, and build the state transition and delay matrix from the trace data to
model the dynamic of HTTP traffic. In addition, the Markov chain is also used in [74]. The
authors proposed a traffic modeling scheme at packet-level, where Inter Packet Time (IPT) and
Packet Size (PS) are considered. It models the traffic generated by each individual Internet
application (HTTP, SMTP, Online gaming, Instant messaging) running on single hosts.
In [77] [82] [76], the authors propose to use analytical distributions to model the traffic
from individual application, e.g. HTTP, TELNET and FTP. Each application is associated
with a predefined distribution (e.g. Poisson/Exponential, Lognormal, Gamma, Pareto and
Multimodal distributions) and the parameters (e.g. mean and variance) are derived from
the trace data. However, as pointed out in [88], the use of analytic models of specific TCP
applications doesn’t scale to developing workload models of application mixes comprised of
hundreds of applications.
The importance of structural models is well documented [86] [119], but a generic structural
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model for Internet applications does not exist to date [79]. In [79], a structure model is proposed
which captures the traffic characteristics at user level, connection level and network level.
In detail, parameters describing user think time between RRE (Request-Reponse-Exchange),
number of RREs, time between connection starts, RREs per connection, response size, user
think time between connection, packet size, packet arrival, network delay and loss rate are
considered in the modeling. In the evaluations, it is shown that SWING is able to capture
the burstiness in the origin traffic. However, as pointed out in the same Chapter, they do not
consider destination distribution and interactions between different applications (hence node
heterogeneity), and regard them as future work. Similar work on layered modeling is also
proposed in [84] with a focus on the framework.
5.3 Node Behavior based Traffic Modeling
5.3.1 Summarization & Comparison of Current Work
To model/generate realistic background traffic, it is required to consider multiple factors
with large dimensions jointly, such as users in the network, applications and destinations.
However, it is a quite complex problem. In order to make the problem doable, different levels
of assumptions are made in the literature.
The fundamental differences between different modeling schemes in the literature are illus-
trated in the lower part of Fig. 5.1. Firstly, although nodes in a network should have different
characteristics in terms of behavior, taking into account each individual nodes in the modeling
requires much more sample traces (for each node) and makes the modeling process less scal-
able. Consequently, the first assumption made for all current models in the literature is that,
all the nodes in the network are homogeneous in behavior. Under this assumption, traffic is
modeled either within individual application or application mix.
Secondly, as the number of destinations in a network is also quite large, further assumption
on destination homogeneity is made in most traffic models. As we can find in Fig. 5.1, most
of work assumes that there is only one (or several) unified destination in the modeling to make
further simplification, only Harpoon and Trident model the network traffic without assuming
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destination homogeneity.
In contrast, as shown in the upper part of Fig. 5.1, by acknowledging the differences in
node behaviors, we consider the traffic as being driven by node behaviors instead of individual
node or applications. This is based on the observation that, although nodes are different from
each other, there must be common behaviors share by different nodes because of the way
people use the Internet. For example, two or more nodes may visit same popular websites,
share same popular songs or files and use the same search engine such as google. Further, the
same application may exist in two or more behaviors, such as the application i in Fig. 5.1 or
the attribute 1 in behavior i, j and k in Fig. 5.5. As a consequence, it is possible to model
network traffic by first finding out distinct node behaviors in the network.
Figure 5.5 Traffic generation from behavior perspective
It is also worth mentioning that, from the node behavior perspective, it can be interpreted
that only one behavior type is considered in the current traffic models (application-mix and
individual-application based). Fig. 5.5 illustrates one such example where two attributes and
four possible behavior types (i, j, k, l) are considered. Since current modeling schemes do not
differentiate different behavior types, they treat the behavior i, j, k, l as one behavior type,
denoted by the biggest ellipse in Fig. 5.5. Consequently, they will generate behaviors other
than the existing ones (i, j, k, l). That is, current modeling schemes may generate unnecessary
traffic combinations all over the dashed square in Fig. 5.5. In contrast, depending on the
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precision level required in modeling, it is possible that different behavior types be combined
for traffic modeling, such as behavior i and l in Fig. 5.5. Therefore, it is possible to relate
previous work on modeling under the behavior based framework, which will be discussed in
the following sections.
5.3.2 Framework Overview
Fig. 5.6 illustrates the behavior based framework for traffic modeling using behavior pro-
files. Taking into account that node behaviors are the real source of all the network traffic,
the framework first uses node behavior profiling to identify all the distinct behavior profiles
in a network, traffic models are further used to model each individual application or applica-
tion mix within each behavior profile. This way, we can utilize all the existing models in the
framework and future models can also be proposed under this framework.
In Fig. 5.6, the core items are the behavior profile extraction engine, behavior models for
each node and traffic models for each profile (if the data is not clean, removal of known attacks
is needed before profile extraction engine). We first introduce the function of each part in the
framework and then the design of behavior profile engine in detail.
5.3.2.1 Behavior Profile Extract Engine & Behavior Modeling
There are two behavior profile extraction engines in the framework. Both of them are used
to extract the representative behavior profiles. Depending of the behavior attributes used, each
behavior profile may consist of a combination of applications, destinations or other features
such as RTT and TTL. The one on the left side is used to extract behavior profiles from the
captured network traces, and the extracted behaviors are further used for traffic and behavior
modeling. Many behavior models can be used; one candidate is to use the behavior profile
CDF for each node because of its simplicity. To generate emulated traffic, behavior profile id is
first generated for each individual node according to its behavior CDF. Traffic models within
each behavior profile are further used to generate the traffic.
The behavior profile extraction engine on the right side is used to extract the behavior
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Figure 5.6 Behavior based traffic modeling framework
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information in real time from the monitored network. Once the behavior profile id is obtained,
traffic can be directly generated from the corresponding traffic models. This is because as
long as the traffic models have been built for each behavior profile in the same network, only
behavior id is needed for real time generation. It makes it possible that researchers generate
the real time traffic of the remote network locally, as long as they have the traffic models for
each behavior profile. Therefore, two types of generation are supported in this framework, real
time and emulated traffic.
5.3.2.2 Traffic Modeling
For traffic modeling within each behavior profile, the framework is open to any existing
or new traffic models. That is, the framework improves the performance of existing traffic
models by preprocessing the network traffic into categories, each of which is driven by the same
behavior. Especially, if the applications within one behavior profile are considered independent,
it is better to use individual-application based model such as TG(1,1) and TG(1,k). Otherwise,
it is better to use application-mix based model such as TG(1,1-k). Unlike [81], the application
mix within behavior profiles is a subset of the total application mix. In this Chapter, we
consider independent applications under each behavior profile. Therefore, in this framework,
it can happen that the same application(s) exists in different behavior profiles. For example,
application 1 is contained in both profile 1 and n. We hypothesize the corresponding traffic
generated by any traffic generator (TG(1,1) and TG(1,n) in Fig. 5.6) does not need to share
all the properties because the traffic is from different behavior profiles. Statistical test is used
to test this hypothesis in Chapter 5.4.
At current stage, we use empirical CDFs (ECDF) to model the traffic characteristics in-
cluding request size, response size, session starting time, connection inter-arrival, # of packets
within connection, # of sessions within application. Similar to [81], session is defined as the
srcIP and desIP pair of a given application. It is worth mentioning that, although the above
parameters do not fully cover all the traffic parameters in traffic modeling, they are among the
most representative ones. Moreover, the results obtained on these parameters are enough to
112
show the heterogeneity in traffic of same application but different behaviors.
5.3.2.3 Privacy Rules & Precision Level
In the framework, the privacy rules are used to remove the sensitive information in the
traffic. For example, source IP addresses should be anonymized during the capture of the trace.
The precision level refers to the precision in modeling the traffic. By adjusting the precision
level of behavior profile extraction engine, we can achieve the flexibility of precision in the
modeling. This is achieved through agglomerative clustering (discussed in the next section)
used in the behavior profile extraction engine, if the clustering threshold (determined by the
administrator) is low, there will be more clusters and hence more precise model of each profile
and vice versa. This feature can make the traffic generator suitable for different scenarios
of evaluation, e.g. for network traffic modeled for external or internal use, the precision in
traffic models could be different, as the more precise of the traffic models, the more likely some
important nodes can be identified.
5.3.2.4 Relating to Current Traffic Models
As we can adjust the threshold in the behavior profile extraction engine, it is possible that
in the extreme case, the threshold is set to be large enough or the maximum value (1 in this
Chapter). Consequently, there will be only one behavior profile in traffic modeling and our
framework backs to the system considered in the existing traffic models (individual application
or application mix models). Therefore, the current modeling schemes can be considered as
special cases of the framework.
5.3.3 Behavior Profiling Extraction Engine
Although there are many possible ways to build the profiling engine, we design it mainly
based on scheme proposed in [66]. Other candidate schemes include [8], the main difference
between [8] and [66] is that nodes are grouped in [8], while similar behaviors are grouped in
[66].
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Figure 5.7 Examples of node behavior overlap
The node behavior profiling approach is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Therefore, we only
cover the main idea in this section. The main idea of the profiling engine is illustrated in Fig.
5.7. As the network applications and destinations are of different popularities, the behaviors
from two or more nodes could share similar patterns (or same profile). For exmaple: for hosts
i, j, the behavior at time 2 of node i is similar to the behavior at time 1 of j. Consequently,
realistic traffic models can be further built for each behavior profile.
Usually, there are a large number of attributes to profile the node behavior and some
may have large dimensions. For example, the dimension of destinations may be quite large.
Therefore, we need to simplify the attributes in a way more favorable for normal behaviors.
Firstly, the destinations are categorized as least, less, moderate and most popular categories
(denoted as Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4 respectively), and the corresponding packets generated in
each category are considered. Secondly, all the services are considered as attributes for node
profiling, as the combination of all the normal services should also be considered normal. In
addition, only TCP traffic is considered. Within each application/destination, the number of
packets sent for that application/destination is considered. In addition, the total amount of
traffic (in bytes) generated and received using tgi and tri for node i are further considered.
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Thus the node behavior xi,t for node i at time t is xi,t = {(pkti,j,t, tgi,t, tri,t, pktd,i,t)|1 ≤
i ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ M, 1 ≤ t ≤ T, 1 ≤ d ≤ 4} (the above parameters are listed in Table 2.1). To
obtain the main characteristics of the node behavior, we remove the inactive xi,ts. For each
service attribute, we count the total traffic (in terms of packets) on this attribute and divide
it by the total traffic added over all the service attributes. If this ratio is too low and less
than a predetermined value (1% in our Chapter), we discard all the traffic information in that
attribute. Thus, we can preserve the main characteristics of node behaviors. Finally, we take
the log value of those attribute values. To identify the profiles, given no prior knowledge on
how many common behavior clusters are shared by different nodes, agglomerative clustering
with extended Jaccard distance (defined as [11]: d(x1, x2) = 1 − x
′
1
x2
||x1||2+||x2||2−x′1x2
) is used
to find possible profiles (clusters) [66]. Largest distance is considered in the clustering. The
basic idea of agglomerative clustering is to treat each xi,t as a cluster at the beginning, then
calculated the pairwise distance for any two points, and combined two points or clusters into
one cluster if the distance between them is below a threshold.
5.4 Evaluations
We use the LBNL enterprise trace data [10] which is the latest and publicly available enter-
prise trace to evaluate the framework. We consider several subnets to evaluate the framework
and achieve similar results. Especially, we mainly include the results of subnet008 and sub-
net021 (represented by port008 and port021 in [10]) in this Chapter. Two one-hour traces are
considered in each subnet (20041216-1618 and 20041215-0510 in subnet008 and 20041216-1016
and 20041215-1012 in subnet021), and there are 1086 nodes in subnet008 and 194 nodes in
subnet021. The time interval used for behavior profile extraction engine is 10 minutes, where
we assume a majority of connections are finished within this period. Similar assumption is
also made in [81].
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Figure 5.9 Dendrogram of subnet021
5.4.1 Behavior Profiles vs Modeling Precision
As node behaviors can be considered the real source to generate the network traffic, the
more node behavior profiles are identified, the more precise it is to model the traffic. Fig. 5.8
and 5.9 illustrate the dendrograms after behavior profile extraction. We can find that the node
behaviors can be well characterized at different thresholds by the behavior based approach.
Especially, when the threshold is set to be 0.4, there are 14 and 13 behavior profiles in each
subnet. Moreover, when the threshold is chosen from 0.4 to 0.85, the resulting profiles range
from 1 to 14 in subnet008 and 1 to 13 in subnet021. That is, it is possible the precision level be
adjusted by tuning the threshold in clustering. For each threshold, corresponding traffic can
be modeled in each behavior profile. This also indicates that, the normal traffic (from normal
behaviors) is of different types and characteristics; only at certain condition (large threshold)
can we consider the normal traffic as one type.
In contrast, as shown in Fig. 5.8 and 5.9, there are only limited numbers of behavior profiles.
Therefore, once the threshold is determined, it is possible to consider the node behavior profile
as an invariant parameter which is useful in the modeling [86]. In addition, although the
number of behavior profiles is larger than 1, it only increases gradually with the decrease
of threshold and is much smaller than the number of nodes in the corresponding network.
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Therefore, it will not increase the modeling time dramatically when existing models are used
in the framework. The different profiling scheme used in [8] also indicates similar results on
another data set, which is out of the scope of this research.
Further, as an example for comparison, Table 5.1 illustrates the detailed behavior infor-
mation of behavior profile 6 and 12 in subnet008, 8 and 12 in subnet021, when threshold is
0.4 for each subnet. We can find that, both these behavior profiles consist of traffic from web
applications, but at different volume and interest. For example, the web traffic is the main
traffic in behavior profile 8 and 12 from subnet021. However, the web traffic from profile 8
shows great interest in those popular destinations (Q4), while the web traffic from 12 seems
to be more interested in those unpopular destinations (Q1). In addition, the volumes of web
traffic are also different from profile 8 to 12. However, it is unlikely that the current models
capture this difference at the node level.
Table 5.1 Traffic information (log)
subnet008
Profile id HTTP Imaps sent rcvd Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
6 0.64 0.18 2.83 3.86 0.22 0.12 0 0.80
12 2.64 0 3.55 5.90 0 0 0 2.64
subnet021
Profile id HTTP Imaps sent rcvd Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
8 3.07 0.19 3.85 6.34 0.1 0 0.77 2.63
12 2.46 0.96 4.54 5.68 2.33 0.75 0.36 1.23
5.4.2 Traffic Homogeneity
From Table 5.1, we find that it is possible that the same application is included in two dif-
ferent behavior profiles. Then, the following question is: does the traffic of the same application
but different behavior types share the same property? To test this hypothesis, we consider the
parameters including request size, response size, session starting time, connection inter-arrival,
# of packets within connection, # of sessions within application. For each application in the
behavior profile, we extract the empirical distributions of these parameters.
As an example, we consider the web traffic from both subnet008 and subnet021 respectively.
During the traffic parameter extraction, although each trace is of two-hour long, by profiling
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the node of similar behaviors, each behavior profile listed in Table 5.1 consists from 40 to 300
behavior records, indicating about 7 (40∗10/60 = 6.67) to 50 hours (300∗10/60 = 50) of data
for modeling. As the length (hours) of data is comparable to CSL data (1.67 hours or 100
minutes) used in Trident [59] and the Auckland data considered in [81] which is two days, we
believe the data can be considered enough to build the CDFs for the corresponding application
and statistical tests.
Fig. 5.10 through 5.12 illustrate the comparison of web traffic from behavior profile 8 and
12 in subnet021 on request size, response size, session starting time. Fig. 5.16 through 5.18
illustrate the comparison of web traffic from behavior profile 6 and 12 in subnet008 on the
same parameters. We can find from Table 5.1 that, the behavior profile 8 and 12 in subnet021
represent similar usage in HTTP, they both generate large amount of HTTP traffic. As noted
in the previous discussion, they are different in destination ranges. Moreover, the shape of the
empirical CDFs looks similar but different in positions. To be specific, in Fig. 5.10, about
80% (from 10% to 90% in CDF) of requests in behavior 8 have size ranging from 2.25 to 2.75,
while this range is from 2.5 to 3 in behavior 12, indicating big difference of web traffic request.
Similarly, in Fig. 5.11, about 80% of responses have size ranging from 2.5 to 4.1 and from 2.5
to 6 in behavior 8 and behavior 12 respectively.
In contrast, profile 6 and 12 in subnet008 represent two different usages of HTTP: frequent
and occasional. Accordingly, the empirical CDFs differ in both shape and position. To be
specific, as shown in Fig. 5.13, although 90% of request share the same range of size, behavior
12 has about 10% request of smaller size that is not covered by behavior 6. Similarly, in Fig.
5.14, the response size in behavior 12 covers a much wider range in the CDF than that of
behavior 6. This also indicates that the traffic under different behaviors may have different
characteristics.
To have a thorough comparison, we further apply the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
(KS-test) [115] to compare in a statistical way if the two CDFs of each feature are from the
same distribution. The two-sample KS-test is one of the most useful and general nonparametric
methods for comparing two samples, as it is sensitive to differences in both location and shape
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Figure 5.17 # of packets subnet021
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Figure 5.18 # of sessions subnet021
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of the empirical cumulative distribution functions of the two samples [115]. The basic idea of
the two-sample KS-test is that, given any two random samples X1 and X2 with size n1 and n2,
for each value x, the KS-test compares the proportion of X1 values less than x with proportion
of X2 values less than x. This is given by [115]:
Dn1,n2 = maxx
|Fn1(x)−Gn2(x)|
and the null hypothesis is rejected at level α if
√
n1n2
n1 + n2
Dn1,n2 > Kα
. The results of KS-test are shown in Table 5.2, where 1 refers to the two CDFs are not
from the same distribution and 0 refers to they are from the same distribution. As we can
find, most of the tests indicate the two CDFs under consideration are not from the same
distribution. As a consequence, in our evaluations, although the above parameters does not
fully covered the traffic characteristics, the results obtained on these parameters are enough
to show the difference in traffic from same application but different behaviors and it should
be better to model such traffic separately to generate realistic traffic. On the other hand, it
is worth mentioning that, in some special cases such as traffic from automatic services (e.g.
automatically check emails very 60 seconds), the traffic could be same in most parameters.
Table 5.2 Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test
trace pkt # request response session # inter-arrival start time
subnet008 1 1 1 1 0 1
subnet021 0 1 1 1 1 0
5.4.3 Realistic Traffic Generation
We also partially evaluate the performance of traffic modeling under the framework. We
simulate the traffic according to the empirical distributions of the above parameters. As an
example, the LBNL trace considered are the web traffic from the behavior 12. Fig. 5.21 to
5.26 illustrate the empirical and simulated distributions of request size, response size, session
starting time, connection inter-arrival, # of packets within each connection and # of sessions
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within each node, we can see the simulated the traffic matches the origin trace quite well. The
KS-test also confirms that the distributions of each figure are the same.
5.4.4 Discussions and Future Work
In general, network traffic is mainly generated by real people using the corresponding
network. However, most major current traffic models only consider application as the real
source of the traffic, which is not real in general unless nodes are assumed to be homogeneous.
In this Chapter, we use the node behavior to capture the difference between real users and
build a new framework for traffic modeling without the assumption of node homogeneity. As
the framework captures the real source of the traffic, the traffic generated under it can be
considered more realistic.
Moreover, based on the evaluations using real user data, we obtain several important obser-
vations that may help the understanding and generation of better realistic background traffic,
including:
1. Even if nodes are different from each other, there are in general similar behaviors shared
among nodes due to the usage of the Internet, and traffic can be modeled from node
bahavior profiles at the node level;
2. Normal traffic is of different types in general, from the behavior perspective. The pre-
cision of traffic modeling can be adjusted by the clustering threshold during behavior
extraction;
3. It is not necessary that traffic from the same application but different behavior profiles
shares all the properties.
In addition, the framework has the following advantages:
1. Full coverage and compatibility: it covers and is compatible with most traffic models in
the literature. In other words, when used under our framework, there is no requirement
to modify the current traffic modeling schemes, and the framework can further help them
to generate better realistic traffic.
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2. Behavior oriented: the framework captures different combinations of node behaviors in
traffic generation. Therefore, it is easy to generate the traffic from any combination of
nodes in the network, which is important for evaluations in distributed environments.
3. Scalable, adjustable and repeatable: the framework is able to be applied to different envi-
ronments and model traffic under different precision requirements. In addition, as shown
in the experiments, no matter what the threshold value is used in behavior extraction,
the number of behaviors identified is generally much fewer than the number of nodes in
the network, which makes the framework scalable. Further, by increasing or decreasing
the number of given behavior profile(s) in the network, we can also scale up and down
the traffic generation under different realistic scenarios.
However, although the LBNL trace is the latest enterprise trace publically available, it was
captured during 2004 and 2005 and might be different from the current enterprise or Internet
traffic. Therefore, more traces including different network scenarios are needed for further
evaluations on this framework and traffic models within it. Additional parameters like packet
inte-arrival time can be further considered.
Furthermore, traffic modeling is not an end to itself. To achieve a complete evaluation, the
performance of the modeling schemes under our framework should be further evaluated by the
current well-known NIDSs. More metrics should be considered for the evaluation, including
false positive rates generated from different current NIDSs on the emulated background traffic.
This is our ongoing work on the top layer in the NetBottle Project [137] [138], where our
ultimate goal is to emulate real-world network traffic in a variety of testbed environments. As
illustrated in Fig. 5.20, the NetBottle consists of three layers: data collection, model construc-
tion and emulation, with the lower layers providing the data to the layer above. Currently, we
plan to use Xen [113] or Xen World [114] to simulate the case of large scale deployment.
5.5 Conclusion
In this Chapter, we discussed the problem of background traffic modeling for NIDS evalua-
tions. Based on the observation of correlations of node behaviors at different times; we propose
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Figure 5.20 NetBottle project
a novel framework for traffic modeling. The framework makes no assumption on node behavior
homogeneity and captures the network traffic from the node behaviors instead of individual
application or application mix. It is shown to be compatible with the major traffic models in
the literature. We also evaluate the framework in our initial evaluations and obtain several
important observations which may be helpful for further studies in this area.
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CHAPTER 6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
6.1 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we study and design efficient and effective techniques to provide security
guarantee for enterprise networks. Two kinds of fundamental areas are considered: malware
detection and realistic background traffic generation. We hope that the proposed schemes can
serve as fundamental components for network security research, and the key observations made
in this research can provide further insight to the difficult problems in network security. Our
contributions in this research are summarized in the following:
1. A new node behavior profiling approach which captures time and node correlations to
study the behavior of normal nodes. We show that it is easy to understand the node
behavior using the profiles and the normal behaviors are generally of different types.
We also show in our evaluations that the behavior profiles are of different popularity
and part of them can be considered statistically stable from the network perspective.
In addition, we give an example on worm detection to demonstrate that the profiles
are capable of being used for further analysis and detection when coupled with different
statistical testing methods;
2. A framework for botnets, which is able to capture botnet structures of all known kinds
and predict new botnets;
3. Based on the proposed framework, we predict a new botnet that we call the Loosely Cou-
pled P2P Botnet (lcbot). It is stealthy and can be considered as an extension of existing
P2P botnet structures. We also design several new metrics and conduct experiments to
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compare the performances between lcbot and other P2P botnets in the literature to gain
insight understanding of P2P botnets;
4. Two behavior based anomaly detection approaches on P2P botnets by coupling the statis-
tical tests with the node behavior profiles identified. In brief, the key difference between
our work and previous work in botnet detection is that, instead of trying to filter out
the botnet behaviors in a network, we detect them by measuring their impacts on one or
more normal behaviors in a statistical way;
5. A fast and optimized anomaly detection approach on P2P botnets. We make use of SPRT
(Sequential Probability Ratio Test) to measure the impacts of the C&C behavior from
P2P botnets (H1) on normal behaviors (H0) in a fast manner. We propose an approach
that simplifies the behavior of each node in a stable way suitable for fast detection via
SPRT. Then, under the worst case attack model, we formulate the C&C detection prob-
lem as an optimization problem and derive the optimal values for H1 mathematically. An
SPRT based fast and optimized detection approach is further evaluated under different
traces;
6. A new traffic modeling structure for NIDS evaluations and several important observations
that are helpful to improve the realistic level of current modeling schemes. By taking
into account that the node behavior is the real source of the network traffic, we take
a step further to propose a novel traffic modeling structure that captures the traffic
characteristics by jointly considering the node heterogeneity with other known features.
We also apply empirical CDFs to model the common traffic features under this structure.
In our initial evaluations, the empirical CDF and the modeling structure work well under
the real user data from enterprise networks. We also obtain several important new
observations that can be further used to improve the current traffic models.
7. Validation of the assumptions made in this research. Simulations and evaluations of the
above approaches are further conducted under real user data from enterprise networks.
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To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose the botnet framework, consider
the worst case attack model and propose corresponding fast and optimized solution in botnet
related research. We are also the first to propose efficient solutions in traffic modeling without
the assumption of node homogeneity.
6.2 Future Work
In this research, we design the cooperative detection techniques that jointly consider host
and network characteristics. As shown in the evaluations, the combination of these two com-
plementary parts can provide good detection results and is promising for realistic traffic gen-
eration. In our future work, we plan to improve and design additional behavior based schemes
and couple them with new network based methods to develop new cooperative techniques. In
particular, we summarize our future work including those discussed in each individual Chapter
as follows:
6.2.1 Evaluations of Anonymization Schemes
One of our future work is to apply the node behavior profiling approach to new research
areas such as anonymization. As shown in our evaluations, the proportion value of the popular
behaviors in CTD/ITD and p0 = Pr(Yi = 1|H0) used in SPRT-FOD can be considered as
an inherent characteristic for the normal traffic in a network. Therefore, they can be used
as metrics for evaluating anonymization schemes on different trace data. In our future work,
we plan to evaluate different anonymization schemes under different metrics, including those
mentioned above.
6.2.2 Improvement of the Existing Approach
We plan to improve the efficiency and coverage of the proposed P2P botnets detection
approach. To achieve this goal, in our future work, we plan to study new metrics that are
stable for normal nodes and can be used for anomaly detection to improve the efficiency.
Additional trace data including normal P2P traffic and P2P botnet traffic will be further
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considered to increase the coverage of the existing approach (e.g. detection of P2P-protocol
based botnets and lcbot).
In addition, visualization is also one of the important parts in our future work. As each
behavior profile can be represented by the cluster centroid and a deviation, with the use of
visualization, it can help the administrators to identify the network anomaly in a fast manner,
without going into too much details of the network traffic.
6.2.3 Coupling with Multi-Variable Analysis
In this research, the node behavior consists of multiple variables. Therefore, it is possible
to apply different multi-variable analysis to study the normal node behavior and additional
statistical tests on multi-variable can be used to design corresponding detection schemes.
6.2.4 Mitigation & Traceback
Once bots/botnets are detected, a followed question is how to find the real person con-
trolling them. This is because detection alone can not stop the use of botnets entirely. For
example, even if the botnet is detected and terminated, it is still possible that the cleaned
machine being infected and used for constructing botnet a second time. On the other hand,
mitigation is also an important question after detection, as we want to minimize the loss by
botnets as much as possible if the detected botnet is launching attacks (e.g. DDoS). These
issues are also quite important to network security and we plan to investigate and develop
effective and efficient techniques in our future work.
6.2.5 High-speed & Large-scale Detection
We plan to develop a new real-time detection system combining non-P2P and P2P protocol
based P2P botnet detection and existing botnet detection techniques seamlessly. The system
should be characterized in layered design with a good sampling strategy, which make it work
in very high-speed (e.g., 1-100G bps) and very large (e.g., ISP level) network environments.
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In addition, all the techniques proposed in this research are passive detection. As the botnet
evolves to more serious types, we plan to investigate active techniques in botnet detection.
6.2.6 Testbed Construction
One of our ultimate goals is to generate different scenarios of realistic background traffic
in the testbed. To achieve it, we plan to use Xen [113] or Xen World [114] to simulate the case
of large scale deployment. Xen is developed by the University of Cambridge, and it is an open
source virtual machine monitor. It is designed to run over 100 full-featured operating system
instances on a single typical computer [114], which is quite suitable for testbed development.
Therefore, by incorporating our traffic modeling framework with Xen Worlds, it is possible to
simulate traffic from hundreds of nodes by using only a couple of actual machines.
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APPENDIX A. Detailed Information of Each Behavior Profile
Table A.1 Detailed behavior information of trace 1526(0107) (logscale)
id http ipp shilp https netbios ssh imaps 8372 byte byte Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
ssn sent rcvd
1 0 3.1269 0 0 0 0 0.4224 0 4.3524 4.8986 0.0172 0 3.129 0.2642
2 0 0 0 0 1.1716 0 0 0 3.0958 3.0046 1.1699 0.1757 0 0
3 0.0645 0 0 0 0 0 0.6788 0 2.003 2.2049 0.3513 0 0.3809 0.0645
4 2.237 0 0 0.2839 0.0215 0 1.1928 0 4.5819 5.1808 2.3456 0.4502 1.5521 0.2653
5 2.5194 0 0 0.5565 0 0 1.3696 0.1522 4.6856 5.7147 2.6351 0.9429 0 1.1843
6 0 0 0 0 0.0699 0 0.9711 0 2.5184 3.1006 0.3681 0 0.7766 0.1079
7 0.4910 3.2015 0 1.7243 0 0 0.9522 0 4.689 5.044 1.823 0 3.208 0
8 2.125 0 0 0 0.0753 2.8 1.437 0 4.977 5.6514 3.0692 0.7787 0.3922 1.2622
9 1.1234 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.4714 3.966 0 0 0 1.1234
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.2679 0 2.659 3.353 0 0 0 1.268
11 1.1026 0 0 1.5343 2.8523 0 1.8386 0 5.3617 5.929 2.943 0 2.112 0.29
12 0 1.426 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.1082 2.534 0 0.301 1.575 0
13 0.942 0 0 0 0 0 0.1003 0 2.347 3.4753 0.963 0 0.1003 0
14 0.1297 0 0 0 0.1165 0 1.7496 0 4.1738 4.361 0.4318 0 0.9971 1.7663
15 1.058 2.7129 0 0 0 0 0.7585 0 3.939 4.6987 0.5204 0.9416 2.7206 0
16 2.7726 0 0 1.0185 0.0602 0 1.7892 0 4.7461 6.2821 2.868 2.0409 1.6185 1.6198
17 0.2158 0 0 0 0.4352 0 1.151 0 3.399 3.8669 0.6511 0 1.3266 0.4034
18 0 0 2.6591 0 0 0 0 0 4.741 4.7182 0 2.6633 0.5396 0
19 2.6702 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.0422 5.5135 0 0 0 2.6702
20 0.5188 0 0 0 0 0 1.2523 0 2.9944 3.5289 1.1795 0 0 0.5604
21 0 0 0 0.625 0.2007 0 1.5816 0 4.6222 4.5431 2.1194 0 1.2412 0.1003
22 0 0 0 0 0 1.6549 0 0 4.3588 3.3499 1.6549 0 0 0
23 0.9488 0 3.6008 0 0 3.1483 0 0 6.2519 6.2235 3.298 3.6009 1.4806 0
24 2.5919 2.7876 0 0.8495 0 0 1.4542 0 5.0925 5.6 2.6073 1.5118 2.7876 1.4978
25 0.2386 0 0 0 0.4226 0 0.4515 0 3.9433 4.5173 0.3495 1.4828 1.8998 0.6021
26 0 0 0 0 1.9368 0 0 0 4.8776 3.7942 1.9368 1.7482 0 0
27 0 1.145 0 0 0 0 1.6958 3.7645 4.0396 6.6823 3.7645 0 1.145 1.738
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.9031 0 2.2529 1.3617 0.4771 0 0.9031 0
29 1.0792 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3.3852 3.9105 0 2.2148 0 1.1761
30 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.9206 0 6.1813 6.1906 1.4314 0 0 3.1495
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APPENDIX B. Main Functions in Agobot
Figure B.1 Main() function in Agobot3-0.2.1-pre4-priv
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Figure B.2 Agomainctrl() function in Agobot3-0.2.1-pre4-priv
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APPENDIX C. Main Functions in SDbot05
Figure C.1 Main() function in sdbot5b
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APPENDIX D. Formulation of SPRT-FOD using Cost
D.1 System Model Considered in SPRT-FOD
For all the nodes in a network, classify them into two types: vulnerable and secure nodes.
The vulnerable nodes refer to those having a higher probability to be infected (e.g. nodes poorly
maintained or having many infection/attack records in the past), while the secure nodes refer
to those having higher security guarantee (e.g. well maintained nodes and used by advanced
users with good security knowledge). Therefore, if infected by bots, all vulnerable nodes can
be controlled by the botmatster.
In contrast, even some secure nodes might be infected by bots, given the higher security
level, the bots are expected to be removed in a much more immediate way. Hence, taking into
account the fact that botnets will be used multiple times, secure nodes are not sustainable to
use for the botmaster. Therefore, we consider those secure nodes not available to the botmaster
during C&C in this system model. That is to say, in this system, only vulnerable nodes can
be controlled by the botmaster, and need to be checked during detection.
D.2 Problem Formulation
Let n be the total number of vulnerable nodes in a network, then n can also be considered
as the nodes needed for SPRT to reach H0 in the normal case. Therefore, from Eq. 4.1 in
Chapter 4, we know that when all other parameters are fixed, p1 is only determined by n and
vice versa. Moreover, from Eq. 4.1, the larger/smaller the n, the smaller/larger the p1. That
is to say, choosing larger p1 (smaller n) means that we should take more effort to ensure the
large portion of nodes to be secure nodes.
Accordingly, if p1 is small (n is large), this means we can take less effort such that only a
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relatively small portion of nodes need to be secure. Therefore, p1 − p0 is a measure on how
much effort we need to take to provide corresponding security level under p0. Since this effort
can be represented in terms of time or money, p1 − p0 can be further considered as a cost
needed to prevent against bots in the corresponding network. Of course, the smaller the cost,
the better the detection scheme from the administrator’s or defender’s perspective.
In contrast, given the provided security level, as discussed in both Chapter 4 and Appendix
5, the portion of bots that can be used by the botmaster without being detected is given as
np′/N (N is the total number of nodes in the testing data, p′ is derived from Eq. 4.7 or E.1).
That is, np′/N is the gain that can be obtained by the botmaster under given p1.
In other words, np′/N is the loss from the defender’s perspective. This loss can also
be considered as a cost in terms of time or money (e.g. damages from the botnet in the
corresponding network). Therefore, we also want this loss to be small.
In summary, the security effort and portion of nodes available to the botmaster can be
considered as costs in terms of time or money. Therefore, we want the overall cost to be
minimized. Without loss of generality, we want the sum of these two losses to be minimized,
which has been discussed in Chapter 4.
In addition, we use Fig. D.1 to better illustrate the idea discussed in Chapter 4 and this
part. In Fig. D.1, although all the parameters including p1 are known to the botmasters,
p1 is not fixed and considered as a variable. To derive the value of p1, different coefficients
can also be assigned to each cost depending on the relative importance of these costs in the
corresponding network.
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Figure D.1 Formulation of SPRT-FOD
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APPENDIX E. Another Solution to SPRT Optimization
The optimization problem of SPRT discussed in Chapter 4 can be also considered in another
much trickier way. That is, in order to be detected under rate γ, the detection scheme needs
to conclude p′ is from p0 at least 1 − γ of time. In other words, this is equivalent to the case
where p0 = p
′ and the false positive rate α′ = γ. Considering the average number n′ caused by
p′ should also be equal to n, we can formulate the above problem in another way. As shown
in the follows, both ways reach the same results in terms of optimal n, hence p1.
n′ = E0(n
′) =
(1− α′) ln β1−α′ + α′ ln 1−βα′
p′ ln p1p′ + (1− p′) ln 1−p11−p′
= n (E.1)
p′ ln
p1
p′
+ (1− p′) ln 1− p1
1− p′ =
(1− α′) ln β1−α′ + α′ ln 1−βα′
n
(E.2)
Similarly, we formulate the detection problem as the following optimization problem:
min
1<n<N,n=f(p1)
c(n) = lu(n) + lp(n)
where
lu(n) = p1(n)− p0, lp(n) = n ∗ p′(n)/N
And the comparison of the previous scheme (p1 based) and this scheme (p0 based) are
illustrated in Fig. E.1 E.2 E.3 E.4. The other parameters are the same as used in Chapter
4. As we can find from these figures, although the combined cost are slightly different, the
minimum values are achieved under the same n (hence (p1)) for both schemes.
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Figure E.1 Optimization on p1 (p0 = 0.6)
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Figure E.2 Optimization on p0 (p0 = 0.6)
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Figure E.3 Optimization on p1 (p0 = 0.5)
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Figure E.4 Optimization on p0 (p0 = 0.5)
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